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Science, Nature and Control: 
Interpreting Mechanics' Institutes 
Steven Shapin and Barry Barnes 
The  study  of  the  Mechanics'  Institute  movement  of  Great  Britain 
has always been marginal to three academic communities - the history 
of  education, the  history  of  science  and  the history  of technology. 
The greatest  quantity  of  empirical historical work on the Institutes, 
and  some  of  the  most  relevant  general  orientations,  comes  from 
historians of  education. Some of  these scholars have made convincing 
cases for approaching the movement, alike with other early nineteenth- 
century  educational interventions,  by setting it  against the social  and 
political  context  of  an  industrializing  s0ciety.l  However,  while  the 
approach via the social history of education has been rewarding, many 
of  its practitioners have felt that the scientific and technical curricula 
of  the  Mechanics'  Institutes  somehow  made  them  'special  cases', 
immune from  contextual analysis  in  the same terms as non-scientific 
institutions. Interpreting  the purposes of  Mechanics'  Institutes would 
be the work of historians of science. 
In  fact,  the  history  of  the  Institutes  has  been  no  more  than  a 
peripheral  concern  for  the  history  of  science.  Its  individualistic 
epistemology  has  suggested  that  'what  people  believe'  can  only  be 
either a simplification of  scientific  truth or a corruption of it; hence 
the diffusion of  scientific  knowledge to 'popular'  audiences has been 
considered only in terms of 'filtration' or 'adulteration'. Viewed  from 
this perspective, instead  of as collective representations needing under- 
standing  in  their  own right,  popular  beliefs  about nature  have  been 
only of marginal  interest.  Exalted above the scope of their contextual 
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methods  by  historians  of  education,  they  have  remained  unworthy 
material for the analyses and exegeses of historians of science. 
In  contrast,  the  Institutes  have  been  justified  and  vindicated  by 
historians  of  technology - not,  however,  on grounds which  stand 
up  well  to empirical  investigation. The Mechanics'  Institutes, so they 
said, brought science to the service of industry, answered the demand 
for  technical  education  from  the  superior  artisan  and  operative, 
performed  important economic functions in an industrializing  society, 
and  were  the  forerunners  of  the  modern  technological  university. 
But,  as  the  social  historians  of  education  have  already  shown,  the 
utilitarian,  'demand-pull'  interpretation  of  the  Institutes  is  certainly 
partially,  and  perhaps  generally,  misleading.  The  founding  of  the 
Mechanics'  Institutes,  like  most  British  educational  policy  in  the 
early nineteenth century, was mainly informed by an interest in social 
control. 
Our purpose  in  this paper  is  to show how the founders of  British 
Mechanics'  Institutes thought a scientific education would  aid  in the 
social  control of  those artisans who were their  designated target. We 
intend to elicit from the public statements of the movement's leaders 
the basis and structure of their own belief  that a regimen of  scientific 
education  for  certain  members  of  the working  class  would  render 
them, and their  class as a whole, more docile,  less  troublesome,  and 
more accepting of the emerging structure of industrial society. 
We  cannot  here  hope to marshal  all  possible  evidence establishing 
the  credibility  of  the  link  between  the  Institute  movement  and  a 
practical  interest  in social control. Nor will space allow us thoroughly 
to  refute  the  credibility  of  the  utilitarian  interpretation  of  the 
Institutes.  We  shall  rely  upon  other  authors for  support  here  and 
accept the social control link as our starting point. Our main proposal 
is  to  develop  an  interpretation  of  'the  scheme  of  things'  in  terms 
of  which  the  proponents  of  popular  education  in  science  might 
plausibly believe that knowledge of a certain kind could control people. 
We  shall go on to show how our interpretation provides an integrated 
explanation of the relationship between the Institutes' original control 
purposes and the nature of the scientific knowledge presented in  their 
curricula. Finally, since the problem of how knowledge is to be related 
to control is  a very general one, we shall draw out some of the wider 
implications  of  the explanation we provide, and conclude by showing 
how the problem of  interpreting Mechanics'  Institutes relates to some 
of  the  most  basic  problems  of  the  social  anthropologist  and  the 
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HISTORICAL RESUME 
Included  in  the designation '~echanics'  Institute' (or, less commonly, 
'School  of  Arts')  was  a  variety  of  early  to  mid-nineteenth-century 
foundations,  all  initially  created  to teach  aspects of  the sciences to 
sections  of  the  British  working  classes.  The  study  of  the Institutes 
is  still  in  its  infancy:  there  is  still  no  modern book-length  account 
of  any  individual  British  Institute,  and  many  of  the questions we 
shall raise go perhaps too far beyond what can be resolved by available 
empirical st~dies.~  Still, sufficient work has now been done to establish 
many features of the movement's history. 
There  is  some  controversy  about  what  constituted  the  earliest 
example  of  a  Mechanics'  Institute, but the choice between  favoured 
candidates  need  not  concern  us here.3  Wt~at matters is that the few 
foundations in existence before 1825 provided a model and inspiration 
leading  to a rapid  proliferation  of  this kind  of  organization  over the 
next two decades.  A  major  catalyst  of this sudden explosion was the 
1825  publication  by  Henry  Brougham  of  his  Practical  Observations 
upon  the  Education  of  the  ~eople.~  very  widely  circulated This 
pamphlet  publicized  the  endeavours  of  the  existing  enterprises  of 
London, Edinburgh, Glasgow and other Northern cities, and set down 
a  general  plan  for  establishing  and  managing  Institutes throughout 
Great  ~ritain.' Immediately following  its  appearance, new  Institutes 
sprang  up  in  profusion,  encouraged  and  supported  by  Brougham's 
Society  for  the  Diffusion  of  Useful  Knowledge  and  its  numerous 
provincial  branches6  Sponsored  by  local  coteries  of  utilitarians, 
Unitarians,  philosophical  radicals  of  various hues, and reform-minded 
civic  leaders,  Institutes  had  appeared  in  practically  every  sizeable 
British  town  by  the  1840s. By  1851, according  to one, apparently 
reliable,  account,  there  were  over  700  'Literary  and  Mechanics' 
Institutes'  in  Great Britain and Ireland, with over 120,000  member^.^ 
This appears to mark the high point of their expansion. 
Demographically,  the  Institutes  were  predominantly  urban 
phenomena, intimately linked with industrialization and its consequent 
social  situations.  A  map  of  industrial  urbanization  in  Britain  would 
overlap nicely with a map of the distribution of Mechanics' Institutes 8; 
they  were  particularly  numerous  in  Lancashire  and  Yorkshire.  The 
most  successful  were  found  in  the  most  vigorous  industrial  and 
commercial  centres:  Glasgow,  Manchester,  Liverpool,  Leeds, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne  all  had  at least  one well-supported  Mechanics' 
Institute founded in the 1820s. 34  Social Studies of  Science 
Except for a very few known cases the Institutes were not projected 
by the same sort  of  people  they  were  intended  to  serve.9  Rather, 
they were  in  general  organized by  interested  members of  the middle 
classes  for  specified  sectors of  the working  classes.  At  the national 
level,  as  already  mentioned,  the  political  allegiance  of  those  who 
advocated  and  established  Mechanics'  Institutes was  predominantly 
Whig  to philosophical  radical,  so  that one very  frequently  finds the 
same  individuals  marching  under  the banners of  'scientific  education 
for  the  working  classes',  'the  Reform  Bill',  and  'opposition  to the 
Corn  ~aws'.lO  At  the local level,  projectors of Mechanics'  Institutes 
may  be  found  among  the  same  sorts  of  occupational  groups  as 
patronized  the provincial  scientific  societies  (the  'Lit  and  Phils')  of 
the  Midlands  and  North  of  England:  physicians,  surgeons  and 
apothecaries;  dissenting  divines;  'enlightened'  manufacturers  and 
merchants.  Having  found  the  cultivation  of  science  appropriate  to 
their  own  situation  in  local  society,  they  now  found  compelling 
arguments for the propriety and value of science for the lower orders. 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  those  who  advocated  this form of 
education possessed  a finely graded  map of society. To speak of the 
Mechanics'  Institutes  as  providing  science  for  'the  working  class', 
as a number of their historians do, misses an important discrimination 
made by the actors themselves,  and puts us in danger of  losing much 
of  the sense  of  purpose  behind  the entire enterprise.  People  in  the 
1820s spoke  of  'the  working  classes'  as  encompassing  a  number  of 
discrete sectors. Thus, when advocates of Mechanics'  Institutes referred 
to  'artisans',  or to 'operatives',  or  'niechanics',  they  did  not  mean 
to refer  to  the 'working  classes'  as  an  entirety.  Rather, they  were 
pointing  to  occupational  sub-categories  which,  to  them,  possessed 
'known'  attributes - economic,  social,  moral and  intellectual. They 
had  it  in mind to provide an educational regimen for these subgroups 
only,  and  not  for  'the  working  classes'  as  a  whole.ll  This  precise 
identification of  the  target  of  the proposed  educational programme 
is  crucial to understanding why the enterprise was deemed appropriate, 
why some sectors of  British  society resisted it, and why the curriculum 
took the form it did. 
In  view  of  the  audience  intended  for  the  Institutes  by  their 
advocates  in  the 1820s, it  is of  some interest  to note that  many of 
the complaints which  began to be heard  as early as the 1830s, rising 
to  a  crescendo  in  the  early  1850s,  charged  that  the  Mechanics' 
Institutes were no longer serving  'mechanics'.  They were, it was widely 
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and  clerks were said  to be replacing artisans and mechanics.12  In  the 
present  state of  historical  research  it  is  unproven whether  the great 
majority  of  the Institutes ever, in  fact, reached  the type of audience 
which  their  founders desired.  Certainly,  membership lists of various 
Institutes suggest  that, by the 1830s and 1840s, the petty-bourgeoisie 
predominated.  But whether  they took over the Institutes or whether 
they  always  outnumbered  the  mechanics  and  artisans  must  remain 
uncertain  for the great  majority  of  organizations.  We  can, however, 
say  with  confidence  that,  given  the  publicly  stated  aims  of  the 
Institutes'  founders and the specified nature of their originally intended 
clientele, the movement was a failure. 
Fortunately, the lack of data on the Institutes' later careers, however 
regrettable,  does  not  seriously  affect  our  present  purposes.  We  are 
primarily  concerned  to  study  the  initial  impetus  to  the foundation 
of  the Institutes, the purposes  they were  intended  to fulfil, and the 
reasons  for  the  original  design  of  their  curricula.  This  involves 
concentration  on  the  Institutes'  pre- and  very  early  history  when 
the aims of founders and supporters were most vocally propagandized. 
Although their subsequent failure is, on our account, very  much to be 
expected, how  precisely  it  came about is of  no great  importance to 
our argument. 
PRACTICAL CONTROL PROBLEMS 
Perhaps the strongest impression one takes away from the voluminous 
pamphlet literature which spewed forth with the birth of the Institute 
movement  is  of the quaintly archaic rhetorical formulations by which 
founders  assured  themselves  (and  their  audience)  that  a  scientific 
education for  the artisan  and  operative  would  result  in  their moral 
improvement.  The  idiom  of  this  rhetoric of  justification  is of  some 
interest. 
The  minds  of  the working  classes  were  assumed  to be  occupied 
'by  objects of sense', so much so that 'when they seek for recreation, 
they  do  it  in  a  sensual  way'.13  Drunkenness,  debauchery  and 
promiscuity  characterized  workers'  behaviour,  according  to  those 
who  advocated  a  remedy  in  scientific  education.  The  curriculum 
of the Mechanics'  Institutes would cope with this situation by rescuing 
'them  from  this  temptation,  by providing  them with  pursuits  above 
the grossness of sensuality': Social Studies of Science 
[it]  reclaimed  many  from  the  habits  of  vice.  It  provided  them with  safe 
and  rational  recreation,  which  might  otherwise be sought  in  scenes of  low 
debauchery, and  it  had  the effect  of  promoting the strength and  prosperity 
of the country in general.14 
In  North  Staffordshire and in Edinburgh the rhetoric was practically 
identical: ' . . . the pursuit of knowledge is advantageous to the working 
man,  by  rendering  him  superior  to  habits  of  drinking,  [and]  by 
introducing  him  to  new  and  purer  pleasures,  and  all  without  any 
necessary  ill  consequences  to  his  superiors'.15 There was assumed to 
be  something  specially  effective  about  scientific  education  in 
accomplishing  this job  of uplift  and  control.  '  . . . By  studying the 
properties  of  matter,  and  the laws  of  nature,  it  will  lead  them  to 
reverence  their  God, on viewing  scientifically  his  wonderful works', 
thereby rendering  workers 'better  husbands, fathers, and brothers'.lG 
The  study  of  the  natural  world,  through  scientific accounts, would 
increase  contentment  by  displaying  'those  beautiful  contrivances, 
by which  the Almighty has adapted the whole system of the universe 
to the comfort and advantage of  man, and which  at one display the 
infinite wisdom and goodness of an all-perfect ~eing'.~~ 
The  Rev  Thomas  Chalmers  saw  science  and  religion  as  being 
alternative means of achieving the same effect: 
There  obtains  a  very  clo\e  affinity  between  a  taste  for  science,  and  a 
taste  for  sacredness.  They  are both of  them  refined  abstractions from  the 
grossness  of  the  familiar  and  ordinary  world; and the mind  which  relishes 
either  has  achieved  a certain  victory of  the spiritual or the intellectual, over 
the  animal  part  of  our nature.  The  two resemble  in  this,  that  they make 
man a more  reflective and  a less sensual being, than before: and, altogether, 
impress a higher cast of respectability  on all his habits, and on all his ways.18 
Scientific  accounts  would  therefore  aid  in  making  a  convincing 
display  of  a  moral  vision.  Thus, a scientific education was  intended 
to have both a general and a special uplifting and controlling outcome. 
In  general, scientific  study was to be  an intellectual  pastime which 
could  be  an  appropriate  alternative to socially undesirable  activities, 
such  as  drinking  and  extra-marital  sex.  More  specifically,  the study 
of  the  natural  world  would  point  out  laws,  relationships  and  the 
presence of  design  of  which the worker would otherwise be unaware. 
And  in  being  thus brought  to perceive this rational  organization  of 
nature,  he  would  perceive  (metaphorically  or  directly) the  rational 
organization  of  society  also, in  its  harmonious relationship  with  the 
natural  world.  The  effect  of  this  perception  would  be  to render Shapin & Barnes: Science, h'ature and Control 
behaviour and values more stable. 
We  might  wonder  why  natural  science, rather than the edification 
of  clerics  and  moralists,  was  thought  particularly  appropriate  as  a 
source  of  uplift.lg  The  reason,  we  are  frequently  told, lay  in  its 
objectivity  and  value-neutrality.  If  the  disruptive  political  literature 
of  the working classes  could  not be supplanted by  a diet of middle 
class moralizing  (as  indeed  it  could  not be),20 then perhaps it could 
be  replaced  by  scientific  works  at least  free  of  disturbing  political 
implications. Moreover, unlike the various brands of political economy 
and  theology,  natural  science  did  not  divide  the middle  and upper 
classes.  Whigs  and  Tories  could,  hopefully,  collaborate  in 
institutionalizing  that diffusion  of  the natural sciences which would 
render  the working  classes  'more unwilling  to  engage in  any bad  or 
hazardous  enterprises'.  'These  are  effects  which  could  benefit  no 
desparate  political  party',  argued  the  Whig  Leonard  Horner  in  an 
Edinburgh  context  rent  by party-ideological  cleavages.  Who  among 
the higher orders could object to withdrawing the artisans 'from angry 
political  discussion,  begun  in  the  workshop  and  adjourned  to the 
alehouse'?21  Controversial  religious,  political  and  political  economy 
literature was almost universally banned from the Institutes' libraries.22 
In  the light  of the uncontrollable  circulation of political,  sentimental 
and  pornographic  literature  among  the working  classes  at the time, 
the appeal of a scientific regimen  to 'crowd  out' bad  influences was 
considerable.  Scientific education could therefore control the working 
classes by substituting good  currency  for bad.  But  at best the actual 
nature  of  the scientific  curriculum  would  have  an  active  stabilizing 
effect. 
This  rhetoric  of  control  reflects  an  authentic  and  deep  rooted 
concern.23 The  ever-pressing  problem of  social  control had  become, 
at the beginning of  the century, particularly acute with regard  to the 
urban working classes.24 For industrial employers, and the bourgeoisie 
generally,  the  problem  of  managing  the technology  and  economics 
of the industrialization process was paralleled by the equally significant 
problem  of  managing  the  behaviour  of  the  labour  force.25  And, 
however much they made of 'laissez-faire'  and the rest, the bourgeoisie 
were  well  aware  that  the evolution of  a society  which  would  serve 
their  interests  demanded  active  supervision  and  careful  intervention. 
There were, moreover, no exemplars of  successful control. No-one 
knew what a stable society based on an industrial city would look like. 
There  was  a  pre-industrial  agrarian  society  that,  at least  in  useful 
myth, was  stable,  and  could  be pointed  to as a model of  a society 38  Social Studies of  Science 
'that  worked';  but  the  'green  and  pleasant'  country-society was  in 
the process  of  being  destroyed, drained  and  distorted  by  the great 
industrializing  cities.  By  comparison  with  the  dominant  image  of 
agrarian  society,  the social  arrangements of  the  industrial  cities did 
not  seem  to be working very well.  In  particular,  the practical  moral 
and  political  management  of  the  working  classes  seemed  intensely 
problematic. 
What  were  the  practical  problems of  social  management  people 
talked  about  in  the British  cities of  the  1820s, in  the environments 
where Mechanics'  Institutes flourished? They talked about the practical 
problems of working-class crime, irreligion, immorality, improvidence, 
and, endlessly, about drunkenness.26 They talked about the behaviour 
and  what  they  held  to  be  the values  (or  lack  of  values)  underlying 
the  behaviour  patterns  which  most  ill-fit  a  smoothly  functioning 
industrial  society. They talked of, and sought remedies for, the crime 
which  made  them  fear  for their  property, the drinking which  made 
their  workers  unfit  for productive  labour,  the supposed  promiscuity 
and debauchery which de-stabilized the family unit and which therefore 
made  the  worker  more  socially  volatile,  the  decline  in  church 
attendance which  withdrew the work-force from a suitable source of 
moral  values  and  homiletic,  the  insolence  which,  when  displayed 
in the High Street, made a mockery of the social hierarchy. 
In the preceding decade, there had been a number of developments 
which  made  these  practical  problems  of  social  management  seem 
even  more acute. The end of  the Napoleonic Wars  in  1815 removed 
that  external  threat  to  British  society  which  was  so  useful  in 
maintaining  a sense of  social  solidarity. When  the French  no  longer, 
as  it  were, unified  British  society  from without, the  cleavages  based 
upon  competing  social  interests  showed  up  more  sharply.  Also, 
following upon the end of the Wars was demobilization  and economic 
slump,  both  of  which  added  pressure  to  the  social  system.  The 
increased  level of 'combination' and trade unionism seemed to present 
a  problem  to  those  who  recognized  emergent  working-class 
consciousness as a serious political development. 
At  the  same  time  the  rapid  growth  of  the  large  industrial  cities 
had  produced  no  adequate  response  from the traditional sources of 
moral  authority;  the  churches,  especially  the  Established  Churches 
of  England  and  Scotland, could  not  keep  up  with  the  demand  of 
burgeoning  urban  parishes.  Less  and  less  provision  was  being  made 
for the moral  management  of  working-class  people,  with  the result 
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system of moral values.  If  measures could not be found to bring them 
back into the moral order, then the successful achievement of industrial 
society would indeed be at risk. 
From  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, institutional  remedies 
had  been  sought  for these problems.  A  whole range of institutional 
forms  was  developed,  from  the  straightforwardly  coercive  to  the 
manipulative  and the educational.  They grew rapidly in  cities hitherto 
lacking  even  rudimentary  forms of  policing  and  law-enf~rcement:~' 
societies for the suppression of  begging,  societies  for the prosecution 
of  felons,  temperance  societies,  friendly  societies,  urban  missions, 
municipal  police  forces,  and,  of  course,  schools.  Sunday  schools, 
sessional schools, industrial schools - all were responses to the practical 
problems  of  managing  an  industrializing  society.  Many  of  those 
individuals  involved  in  the  foundation of  local  Mechanics'  Institutes 
also  assisted  the  development  of  these  other  attempts  at control. 
We  can regard  this plethora of  institutional forms as 'experiments 
in  social  control',  each  reflecting  different  theories  and  strategies. 
Over time, the differential effectiveness of these strategies has doubtless 
had  much  to  do  with  the  pattern  of  institutional  change  and 
development. But, at the time, the dominant strategy stressed internal 
moral  control.  Most  of  the  new  foundations attempted  to achieve 
a  transformation  in  the  values  of  those  who  attended  them; they 
were  designed  to effect  a  system of  values which  would form a base 
for behaviour  most  desired  by  leaders of  industrializing  society,  and 
which  would  militate against disruptive behaviour. Hence, educational 
enterprises were particularly favoured. 
In  1834 Professor James Pillans of Edinburgh University was asked 
by the House  of  Commons Select Commission on Education whether 
he  'consider[edl  that as a means of  prevention  [of crime], education 
stands pre-eminent?' Pillans thought it did: 'So much so, that I conceive 
a  well-digested  system  of  national  education  skilfully  carried  into 
execution, would in the course of a generation or two almost extirpate 
crime.'28  Education  for the  lower  orders  was  thought  of  as useful 
in  respect  of  practical  problems tlites  had  in  making  their  society 
work.  It  was  not  thought  of purely  with  regard  to intellectual  out- 
comes;  those  intellectual  outcomes  were  incidental  features of  the 
educational  institution  on  the  way  to  a  stated,  hoped-for  pattern 
of behaviour. 
Schools  for  the  lower  orders  were  justified  as  instruments  of 
socialization. The knowledge  they  imparted and the manner in which 
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their contribution to a specific job of socialization. The general feature 
of  the  behaviour  of  the working  classes  which  most  disturbed  the 
leaders of  industrializing  society and which most clearly cried  out for 
remedy was its alleged  instability. Industrial society required a stability 
of  routinized  behaviour  which  was  difficult  to  achieve.  To tend  a 
machine a man had  to adapt himself to the requirements of  efficient 
mechanical  prod~ction.~~  was  practical  problem Drunkenness  a 
because  it decreased the stability of  productive behaviour: immorality 
and  sensuality  was  a  practical  problem  because  it  threatened  that 
institution which was thought to stabilize the worker's values generally 
- the family.  The decline  of the authority of religion was a practical 
problem  because,  in  the absence of  a stable source of moral values, 
the worker  might  be swept away  by  any number of  transient  social 
and political  movements. The advocates of schooling for the working 
classes  of  early  nineteenth-century  Britain  alwa?/s argued  their  case 
in  terms of  the  hoped-for  achievement  of  stable patterns of  values 
and  the  resulting  stable  patterns  of  behaviour.  Whether  they  were 
speaking  about  schools  for  working-class  children  or 'adults  their 
advocacy  always stressed  normative  and  social stability as the desired 
outcome of, and justification for, the educational enterprise. 
Educational  programmes for the 'mechanic'  and  'operative'  were 
indicated  by a  number  of  inter-related  control  strategies  elaborated 
from the 1820s onwards and attaining their greatest significance around 
1840.~~ These,  essentially  'liberalizing',  strategies  all  attempted  to 
build  an alliance or a community of interest between the bourgeoisie 
and  the upper  section  of  the working  classes,  the emerging  labour 
aristocracy. In  contrast  to crude attempts at coercion or suppression, 
liberalizing  strategies  involved  policies  of  'cultural  aggression'  which 
by  bribe  or  indoctrination  would  ensure  that  the 'natural  leaders' 
of  the working  classes  identified  with  and affiliated to those above 
them rather than those below. 
Sometimes the emphasis would  be simply upon splitting the lower 
orders and preventing  the growth of  a common consciousness among 
them,  a  crude  policy  of  divide  and  rule.  Sometimes  the dominant 
position  of  artisans  within  the working  classes,  and  the extent  to 
which  other workers  were  influenced  by  them,  was emphasized.  In 
either case, the generation of  interest in property and the implantation 
of  bourgeois  culture  among  'mechanics'  and  'artisans'  was  clearly 
indicated.  Educational interventions were frequently  explicitly linked 
to these policies: Shapin & Barnes: Science, Nature and Control  41 
'The  poorer  classes  are  at  present  set  against  the  rich; they  are taught 
by arrant scoundrels, who speak to their sufferings, that not only the upper 
classes  but the middling classes are their natural enemies and oppressers. . . . 
'Divide  and  conquer'  was  a maxim  of  old.  .  .  . Are we  to  allow  the union 
of bad spirits of various kinds to take advantage of the disunion of the 
wealthy. . . .[!I  31 
Mechanics,  skilled  operatives  and  artisans  (that  is,  the  'targets' 
of  the early Mechanics'  Institutes) were, if  not already an objectively 
defined  labour aristocracy  in the 1820s, well on the way to becoming 
one. Their political development was uncertain.  They  could  lead  the 
working  classes  in  violent  confrontation  with  the  industrial system; 
they  could  lead  them  in  drunken apathy; or, they could come to set 
examples  of  acceptance  and  identification  with  the  values  of  the 
industrial  middle  classes.  In  the  1820s the most  politic  course  to 
take  with  the  mechanic  class  was  a  matter  of  intense  debate. This 
class, unlike the 'labouring  poor',  was almost totally literate.32 What 
they  read,  not  whether  they  should  read,  was  already  a  topic  of 
concern. Many  industrial  leaders feared  that, in  the absence of more 
wholesome food, the  mechanic was serving himself  a diet of  Cobbett, 
Paine  and  pornography.33  The  mechanic  was  possibly  already 
dangerous politicized. 
This  background  of  practical  problems  explains  the  aims  and 
curricula  of  the  Mechanics'  Institutes  at  their  inception.  Such  an 
interpretation  is,  of  course,  in no way  novel.  It  is  standard  to relate 
institutional innovations in the early nineteenth century predominantly 
to an interest  in  social  control.  It  is  always worth exploring whether 
educational  innovation  can  be  related  to  such  an  interest,  as  an 
admirable  and  extensive  literature  in  the  history  of  education 
demonstrates.  With  regard  to  our  present  context,  1.awrence  Stone 
has shown that social control was the 'most powerful argument behind 
extension of education around 1800', and Richard Johnson has claimed 
that  'control  was  the  essence  of  the  phenomen0n'.3~  There  is 
absolutely nothing  special  about Mechanics'  Institutes insofar as they 
manifest  social  control  aspirations  on the part  of their  founders. In 
an  important sense, this is the point.  Several  very  perceptive  writers 
on the history  of  British  education,  including  the above-mentioned, 
have  failed  to  comment  significantly  on  the  Institute  movement, 
while  brilliantly  demonstrating how  social  control  interests  informed 
other educational programmes of  the period.  Indeed,  Stone seems to 
hint  that  quite separate,  technological,  factors must  account  for the 
rise of the  institute^.^^  There seems to be a general difficulty amongst 42  Social Studies of  Science 
scholars in  conceiving  how actors might think that science  could aid 
in  controlling  people.  When  the  curriculum  contains  religious  and 
ethical injunctions, a social control intent has been readily recognized. 
However,  the  presence  of  science,  being  'an  objective  account  of 
nature',  must,  it  is thought, be otherwise explained.  It  is our purpose 
now  to  show  how  it  was  thought  that  science  could  control  the 
mechanic and why it failed to do so. 
THE SOCIAL ORDER AND THE 
INTELLECTUAL ORDER 
The problems of social control which we have stressed were, of course, 
the perceptions of  particular  interest groups in  British  society. Other 
sectors of the nation's  upper classes shared neither the interests nor the 
perceptions  which  indicated  support  for  the  Institutes,  or  indeed 
for  educating  the  working  classes  at  all.  It  may  serve  to highlight 
the  relationships  between  social  experience  and  values,  on the  one 
hand, and the putative role of knowledge, on the other, if  we devote 
some attention to the views of representatives of such groups. 
The  publication  of  Brougham's  Practical  Observations  in  1825 
elicited  a  lively  pamphlet  literature  on the desirability  of  diffusing 
knowledge  to the lower orders. Perhaps the most cogent of the many 
anti-Brougham  authors  was  the  anonymous  'Country  Gentleman' 
who  in  1826  published  his  77-page  Consequences  of  a  Scientific 
Education  to  Working  Classes  of this  ~ountr~.~6  the  The outcome 
of the work  of  Brougham's  Institutes,  'Country  Gentleman'  claimed, 
would  be  precisely  the  social  upheaval  which  Brougham  and  his 
colleagues said they were attempting to avert.37 
How  could  the  groups  represented  by  Brougham  and  'Country 
Gentleman'  maintain  such  different  opinions  about  the  effects  of 
knowledge  on behaviour?  It  is  likely that the answer lies in the ways 
in which the two groups saw their society. 
'Country Gentleman' likens the existing social order to a pyramid -
'the  most  lasting  of  all  buildings'  - in  which  the  working  classes, 
being  the  'base',  support  the  'superstructure'  formed  by their  social 
superiors.38  The  gradation  between  ranks  is  'scarcely  perceptible'; 
the rungs  on the great  chain of social being  are spaced  very finely. 
Social  harmony  reigns,  due  submission  is  observed,  the  'regular 
coherence  and  gradual  subordination'  observed  in  nature  is  also  to 
be observed  in  British  society, now as in the past.39 This social order Shapin & Barnes:  Science, Nature and Control  43 
is related to a moral and intellectual order;  indeed, the one is dependent 
upon  the other.  If  they  'map  onto'  each  other, the social order  is 
stable;  if,  however,  one  is  altered,  the  other  will  change 
correspondingly.  There  is,  appropriate  to  each  rank  in  the  'social 
pyramid',  a  form and  degree  of  knowledge.  If  individuals  are given 
the  knowledge  appropriate  to  those  of  a  higher  station,  they  will 
inevitably,  'human  nature'  being  what  it  is,  press  upwards,  thus 
disturbing the stability  of  the social edifice. Give  everyone  the same 
type  of  education  and  the  result,  to  be  avoided  at  all  costs,  is 
democracy.  Therefore,  our  ancestors  'wisely  confined  the  superior 
sort  of  education to  birth  and  wealth  . . . ;  because, where either 
one  or  the  other  was  clearly  superior,  education  or talents  would 
be less  invidious,  and less  likely, by producing  discontent, to disturb 
the well-being  of  the state.'40  If,  in  fact,  the  existing  social  order 
is  stable,  then  there  is  no justification  for  altering  the  distribution 
of  knowledge  in  society,  and every  reason for keeping  it  as it  is.  If 
Brougham's  prescriptions  are right, either 'our  ancestors'  were wrong 
(which  is  unthinkable),  or  'some  change  has  taken  place  in  society 
which  has  rendered  such  an innovation  necessary  to the welfare of 
the state.'41 
This,  of  course,  is  the  crux of  the matter. 'Country  Gentleman', 
from his perspective, does not recognize any such fundamental change 
occurring  in  British  society,  whereas  Brougham  and  the advocates 
of popular education take it almost as axiomatic that important change 
has occurred  and that dealing  with  it  is  a pressing  practical problem. 
'Country  Gentleman'  does  not  see  the social  hierarchy  as  having  a 
dynamic  aspect;  Brougham  does.  We  should  say  that  the one can't 
see what the other can't help but see. 
It  has  been  said,  'Country  Gentleman'  admits,  that the processes 
of industrialization and urbanization have already irrevocably  changed 
the  configuration of  British  society, that  the  lines  of  control  have 
already been  blurred.  But,  from  his  country  seat,  the opponent of 
popular  science  dismisses  'the  changes  that  wealth  and  commerce 
have  made'  as mere 'excrescences'  on the side of the social pyramid, 
'which  do not  very  materially  affect the edifice'. The danger  is  not 
in  social  change; that  is  essentially  illusory.  The  danger  is  in  plots 
like Brougham's: 
A  scientific  education  to  the  working  classes  of society would derange 
the  base.  This  constitutes  the  danger; for  any  alteration  there,  will  level 
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Where Brougham and the projectors of  Mechanics' Institutes sought 
institutional remedies to the problem of a breakdown in social control, 
'Country Gentleman' saw no such breakdown. The stability of society 
did not have to be reconstituted or assured; based on due subordination 
of  ranks and recognized lines of authority, it was a fact. This difference 
in  perception  may  well  correspond  simply  to differences  in  social 
experience.  Agrarian  society  was  perhaps  indeed  relatively  stable; 
certainly  it  was stable with  reference  to conditions in places like the 
Manchester  and  Glasgow  of  the  1820s and  1830s.  Perhaps, indeed, 
in  'Country Gentleman's'  village, control was achieved through shared, 
accepted  and  traditionally  institutionalized  sources  of  authority. 
The  relationships  between  the  arguments  for  and  against  the 
Mechanics'  Institutes and those relating to popular education in general 
become  clear  if  one  examines  the  general  educational  propaganda 
of  the early  nineteenth  century which  Brougham and  his  colleagues 
drew  upon.  Among  the most influential of the pro-popular education 
writers  cited  by  Brougham  and  others  is  John  Foster  (1770-1843), 
a  Baptist  minister  and  essayist  whose Essay  on the Evils  of Popular 
Ignorance  (1820) argued  the Christian  case  for educating  the lower 
orders  of  British  society.43  Like  Brougham,  and  unlike  'Country 
Gentleman',  Foster  regarded  education  as  a remedy for social  illness. 
Society  had  in  fact  fundamentally  changed  in  character,  the change 
was still  in  process,  and authority relationships  in  society were being 
seriously  disturbed.  Since  the  nature  of  society  had  already  come 
into question, there was no going back; rather, the remedy was, through 
educating  the  people,  to  provide  them  with  satisfying  answers  to 
questions raised : 
Times may have been  when  the great mass  . .  . combined  such  a quietude 
with their ignorance, that they had no other than submissive feelings towards 
these superiors . . . ;when  no question would  ever occur to them why there 
should be so vast a difference of condition between beings of the same race; 
when  no other proof  was  required  of  the just  appointment of  their lot  . . . 
than  their  being  actually  in  it; and  when  they  did  not  presume,  even in 
thought, to make any inferences from the fact of the immense disproportion 
of  numbers  and  consequently  physical  strength  between  them  and  their 
superiors.  But  the  times  of  this  perfect,  unquestioning,  unmurmuring 
succumbency under the actual allotment, have passed away. . . .44 
Foster  saw  that  the  fabric  of  society  had  been  rent  and  that  the 
reconstitution  of  the  social  order  was  dependent  upon  the 
reconstitution of the moral and intellectual order. Indeed, the Christian 
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amounts  to  little  more  than  this  argument,  variously  embroidered. 
Popular  education was self-consciously  an innovation, to be defended 
in  terms  of  novel  social  disorders  which  the new  moral  order  was 
to cure. 
Those  who,  like  'Country  Gentleman',  argued  that  Mechanics' 
Institutes (and, in fact, all forms of popular education) would corrupt 
the social order were  refuted  by others who gave  a vivid  account of 
an already corrupted society: 
We  must  accuse  the progress  of  wealth,  the increase and  condensation 
of  the  population,  the  facilities  of  locomotion,  the  quick  circulation  of 
intelligence.  We  must  accuse  commerce,  manufactures,  steamboats,  stage 
coaches, newspapers; these are the real cause of the change in the community. 
Let those who entertain a doubt upon this point compare the different parts 
of  the  same  country;  let  them  compare  the  manufacturing  with  the 
agricultural  counties; let  them  compare the towns even  of the same county 
with  its villages; or let them compare a retired village, which had  little inter- 
course beyond  its  nearest  market,  with  a  village  on some high  road; and 
they will  soon perceive  in what the difference of character really originates. . . 
We  must  refer,  then, to  the  state of society as  the cause of  corruption if 
the minds of the people are corrupted. . . .45 
Where,  in  places  with  a  traditional  economy  and  social  structure, 
there remained  a  'a  spirit  content to go forward  in  the beaten path', 
among  industrializing  communities  there  was  'a  leaven  .  .  .  of 
discontent and restles~ness'.~~ 
IMPUTING THE CHARACTEXISTICS 
OF THE MIND 
In the debate over the most desirable social distribution of knowledge, 
actors  revealed  a  number  of  organizing  assumptions  and  theories. 
One  of  these,  as  we  have  seen,  was  that  there  had  to  exist  an 
isomorphism  between  the social and the intellectual,  cognitive  order 
if  society  was to be stable. Another was that knowledge, if  it were to 
be  successfully  transmitted,  must  be  'appropriate'  to  circumstances 
of its  recipient^.^'  It  must therefore be tailored to their  environment 
(and thus their social standing), and to their nature, or what we today 
would  call  their  intellectual  capacities.  It  is  particularly  interesting 
to examine  the way  in  which  informal theories of the mentality  of 
the lower  orders  thereby  came to influence  proposals  for  curricula 
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what these theories were. 
Central to the construction of a map of the lower orders' mind was 
the  notion  of  hierarchy.  Both  projectors  and  opponents of  popular 
education accepted that there was a social  hierarchy, however much 
they differed as to its details, future and present  stability. They also 
both  accepted  that  the superior  sort  of  person  was  endowed  with 
or  characterized  by  a  superior  sort  of knowledge,  and, conversely, 
that  the  kno~vledge of  the  lower  orders  was  in  important  ways 
defective.  They  shared  this  fundamental belief  whether or not they 
shared a belief  in the desirability or possibility  of improving the minds 
of the lower orders through education. A  number of polar oppositions 
were generally used to contrast thought at the base and summit of the 
hierarchy  and  to  characterize  the  lower  orders  as  'stupid'.  The 
multitude's  thinking  was  'superficial'  rather  than  'profound;'  it  was 
based  upon  sense  data  rather  than  abstract  organizing  principles, 
and was accordingly  'sensual',  not  'rational;'  it was 'inconsequential', 
unlike  the  thought  of  the higher  orders which took proper  account 
of  the  consequences  of  action;  it  was  'fragmented',  and  failed  to 
perceive  those necessary  connections between phenomena which gave 
the  upper  classes  their  integrated  overall  understanding  of  society 
and natural reality.48 
These oppositions may all  be found in the already cited polemical 
literature  dealing  with  Mechanics'  Institutes  and  popular  education 
in  general  during the early nineteenth century. The equation between 
the 'superficiality'  of the working-class mind and the defective nature 
of their thought is clear in 'Country Gentleman's' statement that 'The 
populace  ever  judge  superficially;  the  probability  therefore  is  that 
they  are  ever  wrong.  . .  .'49  'Truth',  he  explained, 'is  said  to lie  at 
the bottom  of  a well,  not on the surface: in  other words, whatever 
appears only superficially right,  is  probably wrong.'50  Reality, there- 
fore, lies  deep; access  to it  requires the going behind of appearances, 
whereas the imputed characteristic of the lower-class mind  is  precisely 
its  entrapment  in  appearances.  Similarly,  'Country  Gentleman'  was 
totally convinced that the lower orders' characteristic relish for 'sensual 
and  vulgar  gratifications'  could  never  be  overcome  by  an  induced 
'love  of learning'.51  Sensual gratifications were 'appropriate' to minds 
governed  by  sense, because  they  could  not  discern  enduring  moral 
verities  lying  deep  beneath  superficial  sensual  distortion.  Even  the 
virtues  of  mechanics  could  be  turned  against  them with this  idiom. 
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that  practice  and  theory  seldom  unite  in  the  same  individual;  that  the 
occupation  of  the  practitioner  requires  all  his  time  and  thoughts to fulfil 
the  wishes  of  his  eye  or  hand:  whilst  the theorist  reasons within  himself, 
and  throws  himself  on  his  mind.  Theoretical  excellence  must have  reason 
for its soil, which mechanics have not.52 
The  interior abode of 'reason',  contrasted with the exterior quality of 
'sensual  apprehension',  therefore  mapped  onto  the social  hierarchy. 
The  lower  orders were  characterized, morally  and  intellectually,  as 
having  little notion of things except in  'external practice'. They lacked 
'that  busy  interior  existence,  which  is  the  moral  person'.  They  did 
not  apprehend  'ideas  of  what  they  cannot  or  dare  not  practically 
realize'.53  The  daily  occupations  of  the working  classes  made few, 
if  any, demands  upon  the interior  intellect; their  minds  resided  in 
their  eyes  and  hands,  and  were,  therefore,  susceptible  of  being 
unthinkingly routinized : 
[We  may]  take  into  account  of  the  allotment  of  employments  to the 
uncultivated multitude, how much  facility  is  acquired  by habit,  how much 
use  there  is  of  ~n\trumental mechanism  (the  grand  exempter  from  the 
responsibility  that  would  lie  on  the  mind),  and  how  merely  general  and 
very  slight  an  attention  is  exacted, in  the  ordinary  course  of  some of  the 
occupations.54 
11s  well as being shallow and sensual, the thought of the lower orders 
was  inconsequential;  it  lacked  purpose;  it  was  insensitive  to  'what 
things  really  mean'.  'One  of  the most  obvious circumstances  [of the 
'ignorant  class] ', F:oster  wrote, 'is  the perfect  IIOIZ-esistet~cetheir ivz 

minds of'awy notion or qziestioit what their lifp is for, taken as a whole'. 
Their  heads are full  'of  trifling  and corrupting ideas',  but they never 
think:  'For  what  purpose  am  I  alive?  What  is  it  that  I  should  be? 
Does  it  signify  what  I  may  be?' Their  thought lacks  a 'general  and 
leading purpose'.  55 
Perhaps  the  central  opposition  underlying  all  these  various 
imputations  is  that  between  'organized'  and  'fragmented'  thought. 
We  are offered a general characterization of the thought of the lower 
orders as  'broken-up', marked  by transient and ephemeral impressions 
from  the  sensuous  world  and  the  passions,  without  the  integrating 
cement  of a  patterned  texture  of  meanings,  necessary  connections, 
causal laws, and the like. The contrast between the top and the bottom 
of society is made in terms of the distribution of what we may loosely 
call two opposed epistemologies. 
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epistemologies  was  made  on the basis  of  concrete  empirical  study. 
It  is  more likely that it  evolved  as a legitimation of the social order; 
it justified  the division of labour in society by accounting it  'natural'. 
However,  once  established as accepted wisdom, such a theory could 
be  used  to  explain  working-class  behaviour,  and  to guide  initial 
attempts to control it. 
Thus,  by  characterizing  the  thought  of  the  lower  orders  as 
fragmented  and  governed  by  transient  impressions,  their  perceived 
immorality,  insolence,  sensuality  and  political  volatility  could  be 
'explained'.  As  they  grasped  no  abstract  moral  and  intellectual 
principles,  they were  at the mercy of whatever  passing  desire, whim 
or fancy arose from within or was impressed on them from without. 
Since they had  no stable moral and intellectual framework with which 
to  evaluate  actions,  any  political  rabble-rouser  could  simply  sweep 
them  along  (see  note  85, below).  Bad  influences  simply  impressed 
themselves  upon  their  minds.  Good  influences  would  presumably 
impress  themselves  equally  easily,  but  were  distressingly  uncommon 
in their environment. 
For  those  who  found  the  social  control  of  the  multitude 
problematic, this account of their mental characteristics also indicated 
a  remedy.  An  educational  regimen  was  required  which  took  into 
account  the  nature  of  the minds  with  which  it  was  going  to deal, 
and which sought to instill  in  those  minds the stable intellectual and 
moral patterns which it was felt they presently lacked. 
THE CURRICULUM 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  consider  the  curriculum  which  the 
Mechanics'  Institutes  were  expected  by  their  founders  to  sustain. 
Its intended nature is easily ascertained, although exactly how success- 
fully  it  was  embedded  in  teaching  activity  is  more  problematic.56 
To  summarize: the curriculum  was to be scientific; 'pure' rather than 
'applied'; factual rather than theoretical or speculative; and 'simplified' 
in presentation. 
In  the early  curricula of  most of  the Institutes for which we have 
evidence, the natural sciences  predominated.  Although  few  Institutes 
continued to steer so close to their originally charted  scientific course 
as the Edinburgh  School of  Arts, that enterprise was widely cited as 
the  purest  expression  of  the original  ideas  and  its  curriculum  was 
copied  by a  number  of  other  ~nstitutes.~'  The plan of the School, 49  Shapin & Barnes: Science, Nature and Control 
as  designed  by  Brougham's  friend  Leonard  Horner,  was  to  teach 
chemistry  and  mechanical  philosophy.  Mathematics  was soon added 
but other, seemingly more 'practical', offerings like veterinary medicine 
were  resisted  by the Directors  as being outwith their purpose.58 The 
central position  in the curriculum of physics, chemistry, mathematics, 
the  earth  and  life  sciences  (impressionistically arranged  in  order  of 
importance) characterized the great majority of  Institutes in their very 
early  years.  By  the  late  1820s and early  1830s very  many, perhaps 
most,  had  presented  lecture  courses  on  phrenology,  as a science of 
mind  and  philosophical  system.59  The  general  tendency  during the 
1830s was for the proportion of  courses in  the natural sciences to be 
diluted,  usually  by  the  addition  or  substitution  of  the  fine  and 
performing  arts,  languages,  drawing, and  the  like.  But  this  shift  in 
the content of  the curriculum  corresponds to a previously-mentioned 
shift in the Institutes' purposes and clientele, and will not be discussed 
here.60 
In  itself,  an  elementary  science-based  curriculum  concentrating 
upon the presentation  and  demonstration  of  clear-cut facts and  laws 
may serve a variety  of functions and interests. Those which are most 
relevant in the present instance are, however, readily discernible. Those 
features  of knowledge  which exposed  its theoretical  and conjectural 
qualities,  and  hence  weakened  its  credibility,  were  systematically 
eliminated. So were those which facilitated original speculative thinking 
(despite utilitarian rhetoric upon the value of the innovating mechanic). 
What  was retained was all that might implant a subtle model of natural 
order  in  such  minds  as  the lower  orders were  thought  to  possess. 
The  knowledge  of  nature  in  which  the  intelligentsia  orientated 
themselves  was  not to be the knowledge of nature presented  to the 
mechanics.  As  the  Rev  Thomas  Chalmers  put  it, by  analogy  with 
missionary  work,  it  had  been  found  more  expedient  to  'let  down 
English  knowledge  and  philosophy  to  the  capacity  and  station  of 
the  Hindoos'  than  to attempt  to  'raise  the Hindoos to the level  of 
English  knowledge  and  philosophy'.61  Brougham  argued  that,  in 
teaching the 'multitude' geometry, 
it  is  not necessary  to go  through  the whole steps of that beautiful  system, 
by  which  the  most  general  and  remote  truths are connected  with  the few 
simple  definitions  and  axioms;  enough  will  be  accomplished,  if  they  are 
made to perceive  the narure of geometrical investigation, and learn the leading 
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The  facticity  of knowledge  was to be emphasized  at the expense 
of  its  metaphysical  and  hypothetical  character.  Thus,  an organ  of 
the Church  of  Scotland  approved  of the Edinburgh  School of Arts' 
curriculum and teaching, but condemned the idea of workers spending 
their time 
in  puzzling  [their]  brains in  algebra . . . ,  or in  wandering in the thorny path 
of metaphysics, or in  the ill-macadamized roads of even  physics themselves, 
where the lecturers . . . stand waving their  rods over kittle curves and conic 
sections,  and  statements of  the differential calculus,  rather  than in  showing 
by experiment how things really are in nature . . .63 
The  central  notion,  shared  by  very  many  of  the  projectors  of 
Mechanics'  Institutes,  was  precisely  this: to show  'how  things  really 
are in  nature',  rather than to stress,  or in  some cases  even to allude 
to,  the  provisional  nature  of  scientific  knowledge.  The  world  of 
workers' science was a world of facts and laws, not a world of theories 
so  identified.  Where  Brougham or Horner  might orientate themselves 
in  a  body  of  scientific  knowledge  which  was  partly  hypothetical, 
wholly  provisional,  and  recognized  as  theoretically  informed,  the 
scientific  knowledge  presented  to  mechanics  was  to  have  none  of 
those  characteristics.  It was  hard, factual, solid  and enduring; in  no 
way tentative or  re~isible.~~ 
Even  mathematics  was  subject  to  audience-dependent  adaptation 
of this sort. The Scottish educationalist and natural theologian Thomas 
Dick referred to the 'scientific  method of instruction generally pursued 
in  colleges and academies', wherein the student worked through Euclid 
and  'the  higher  algebraic  equations',  his  attention  being  'chiefly 
directed to the demonstration of mathematical  propositions, without 
being much exercized in practical calculations'. But 'a different method 
ought to be pursued  in schools chiefly devoted to popular instruction'. 
Let  the  student  concentrate  upon  'practical  geometry',  only 
occasionally  exhibiting  some  of  the abstract  rules,  'in  so  far  as  he 
is  able to comprehend  it'. Practical operations of geometry and their 
'general utility' will enable the student in such schools to comprehend 
the subject  more  than  'were  he to consider them as relating merely 
to abstract  truths'.G5  Another  Scottish  educationalist,  James Pillans, 
claimed  that  in  failed  popular  educational  establishments  the prime 
reason  for  lack  of  success  was  teaching  which  was  'too  abstruse', 
which contained 'too much abstraction'.66 
The  science  intended  for  the  lower  orders  was  a  highly  reified 
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it  affected  to be indubitable. Thus, in  the Edinburgh  School of Arts 
great weight was put upon actual demonstrations, concrete observable 
illustrations  of  'how  things  really  are',  which  were  argued  to  be 
uniquely  adapted  to  teaching  the  lower-class  mind.  Actual  things 
which  could be seen and  handled  were preferred subjects of study -
machines,  chemical  substances,  geometrical  diagrams;  not  algebraic 
variables  and  equations, metaphysical  principles  and  unexemplified 
verbally expressed  relationship^.^' 
The immense popularity  of  phrenology as  an element  in  workers' 
education  in  the  1830s is  a  prime example of reified  knowledge  as 
fit  meat  for  the  lower  orders.  In  phrenology,  as  contrasted  with 
academic  mental  science,  abstract  faculties  become  'things',  that is, 
parts of the brain. An  observable entity is substituted for an abstract 
entity.  Society is  reified  as  the outcome of the workings  of parts of 
individuals' brains.68 
Recalling  our  actors'  model  of  the lower  orders'  mentality,  one 
can  recognize  that  this reified  curriculum  was intended to 'put  into 
their  heads',  in  the most  efficient  and  most  'appropriate'  way,  an 
authoritative  depiction  of  the natural  world - of 'how  nature was'. 
All  that remains is to enquire why such an insertion was attempted. 
What  was such a representation expected  to do, once it  had reached 
its  target?  How  could  it  alleviate  the problems involved  in the social 
control of the lower orders? 
Certainly,  part  of  the  answer  lies  in  treating  the science  of  the 
Institutes'  curriculum as a control ideology analogous to earlier variants 
of natural theology and political economy. models of nature are among 
the  universally  available  resources  invoked  to  set  limits  on  the 
possibilities  of  human  action.  In  particular, where  people  refuse  to 
recognize  the  inscrutable  whims  and  fancies  of  God  as  moral 
constraints,  the  more  tangible,  impersonal  limits  allegedly  inherent 
in the operation of the natural world are likely to be invoked instead. 
Such  conceptions  are,  of  course,  readily  discernible  at  this  time 
in  'what people actually said' about the purposes of popular education. 
Again,  John Foster is  perhaps the most  interesting  link between  the 
Institute  movement  and  popular  education  in  general in  the 1820s. 
In  his Essay  on  the Evils of  Popular Ig7zorance he describes the relation- 
ship  between  the mental  characteristics of  the lower orders and the 
problems  of  bringing  credible  sanctions  to bear  on their  behaviour. 
The lower orders,  we remember, are blind to abstract  principles, and, 
therefore, the notion of  God as an abstract entity has 'but slight power 
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after  it  is  committed'.  Such a  God  lacks efficacy as a moral sanction 
'because  he  is  invisible'.69  As the lower orders are, however, sensitive 
to  the tangible  and  the  concrete,  they  usually  do obey  limits  like 
walls and fences. The great problem is to make them aware of, almost 
literally  'to  see',  abstract intangible  limits and moral principles which 
'we' recognize. Thus: 
as [the ignorant worker]  is nearly destitute of that faculty of  the soul which 
would  perceive  .  . . the awful  interceptive  lines  of  that other arrangement 
which he is  in the midst of as a subject of the laws of God, we see with what 
insensihility  he  can  pass  through  rhwe  prohihitory  <igllifications of  the 
Almighty  will,  which  are to devout men as lines streaming with an infinitely 
more formidable than material fire.70 
The  Church,  with  its  abstract  God, 'who  is  somewhere  in  the sky, 
has  not, to them, the smallest  force of  intimidation from evil'.  New 
sources  of  moral  sanctions must  be  developed.  In  the distant  past 
of our race, Foster believes, 
some  right  injunctions of  morality  . .  .  [were]  infixed in the popular mind 
as  a  matter  of  conscience, by  the great  array  of  things pretendedly  divine 
and  demi-divine  which  surrounded,  and  pressed  closely  and powerfully  on, 
the mind of the multitude. Whereas  now, when this great array is  vanished, 
there  is  nothing,  absolutely  nothing,  to enforce moral  principles  and  rules 
on the ignorant  portion of  the people with  the mighty  authority of Divine 
sanction.71 
Although  Foster did not fully articulate the solution, those who read 
his work did. The solution was in part to use a new  'divine'  or 'den~i- 
divine'  nature  to  exert  those  moral  sanctions  required  to  control 
an  unstable  multitude  - a  'demi-divine'  nature  which  was, 
appropriately, tangible and observable. 
That  'demi-divine'  nature  was  the  construction  of  the  natural 
theological  science  of  late  eighteenth- and  early  nineteenth-century 
Britain. The study of  nature through science revealed  moral purpose 
and  significance  in  the  world  which  could  be  encoded  as  ethical 
principles  appropriate  for oneself  or others. Explicitly, the study of 
nature  was  recommended  to  mechanics  as  it  revealed  the wisdom 
of  God in  creating things as they were. 'Knowledge',  said oce popular 
scientific lecturer, 'is virtue': 
All  nature  . . . offers examples innumerable of the power and wisdom with 
which  [God] works throughout the visible world before us.72 Shapin & Barnes: Science, Nature and control  5 3 
Nature  was  God's  creation;  it  was  His  visible  message  and  the 
respository  of  His  plan.  Nature was therefore  a good  nature,  and  if 
it  appeared to be  evil  or  unjust, there was  God's  beneficent purpose 
behind  what  appeared  to be evil,  such as  the existence of  the social 
hierarchy.  The moral lesson to be learnt via the inculcation of  natural 
theological  science  was  one  of  acceptance,  of  appreciating  the 
systematic connections which made a seemingly unaccountable world 
accountable in moral terms. 
Interestingly,  this  natural  theological  knowledge  was  much  more 
frequently  encountered  in  the  Institutes  than  political  economy, 
which drew analogous conclusions from 'the scientific study of natural 
laws', and which  might  have  been  expected to have greater appeal to 
Whigs and reformers. Political economy and its 'iron laws' were indeed 
frequently  explicitly  excluded  from  Institutes'  curricula,  whereas 
the  natural  theological  flavour  of  many  courses,  particularly  in 
physiology, phrenology and, to an extent, the earth sciences is  readily 
apparent. The phrenologist-educationalist George Combe, for example, 
was a strenuous advocate of the teaching of physiology to the common 
people.  In  a  pamphlet on the subject he proposed  a model catechism 
which  opened  with  the physiology  of  digestion  and  concluded  with 
the following exchange: 
Q.  If  God  has established  all  this  in  the framework of  our bodies  and  the 
endowment of our minds, is  he  a clever  fellow  who tries  to find  a shorter 
way than by skilful and honest labour, to a supply of bread, who, for example, 
cheats to get  it, or steals  it? 'No,  Sir.' . . . Q. If, then, by working skilfully 
and  honestly  each  of  us in  our own  line, and exchanging our articles, we 
are all  better supplied,  and  if  God  has arranged things in this manner, what 
kind of conduct does He prescribe to us, and approve of?73 
God  is the ultimate source of moral suasion but now  He  acts through 
nature  and  natural  laws.  In  the  case  above,  diligent,  honest  and 
specialized  labour  is  sanctioned  by  the  laws  of  physiology,  which 
God  frames  and  guarantees.  It  is  nature  and  the action  of  natural 
laws which  exact their  toll on those who violate 'natural'  behat'  'lour : 
The  whole  objects  and  phenomena  treated  of  in  the  sciences,  are  the 
institutions  of  God  . . . ; and  . . . we are bound by duty to God, as well  by 
a  regard  to our own welfare,  reverently  and diligently  to study these, and 
to  regulate  our  own  conduct  in  conformity  to  their  modes  of  action.74 
It  is not an abstract God that will strike us down if  we violate a code 
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afflictions  await  us  if  we  drink  to  excess,  are  idle  or  sexually 
promiscuous.  The body exacts its  revenge on those who abuse it; the 
workings of the body are interpreted by science: 
It  is  only by diligent  study of  the order of  nature  that we  shall  learn how 
to accommodate  our conduct to the  Divine  laws,  which regulate prosperity 
and  adversity,  health  and  disease,  life  and  death,  in  the  present  state  of 
existence.75. 
It would, however, be misguided to treat the science of the Institutes 
simply  and  solely  as a variant  of  natural theology, and we  certainly 
do  not  advance this thesis.  It  was, after all, mathematics, mechanics 
and  chemistry  which  initially  were  given  pride  of  place  in  the 
curriculum, not physiology and phrenology. Without doubt one could 
draw  teleological  implications  from  mathematical  and  mechanical 
principles,  but  they  are  scarcely  the  most  promising  bases  for  an 
exercise  in  Nor  is  there  any  but ideological'  manip~lation.~~  the 
thinnest  evidence  that  such  principles  were  taught  other than  in  a 
reasonably  straightforward,  if  rather  didactic,  way.  Few  of  the 
mathematical and physical texts employed came to include the passages 
of  moralizing  and  homiletic  characteristic  of  many  works  in  other 
fields, and even of some of the physical  science books written for use 
by ~hildren.~' 
Why,  then,  was  there  such  enthusiasm  for the most  apparently 
'value-neutral'  forms  of  science  on the  part  of  the  founders  and 
supporters  of  the early  Institutes - people  who,  as  we  have  seen, 
were  predominantly  interested  in  the  defence  of  social  order  and 
stability?  Why  should  science  in  general,  and  not  just  particular 
appropriate fields,  be  thought  to  possess  a  conrol function?78 And 
why  should  mathematics  and  mechanical  philosophy  be  set  above 
such  apparently  more  promising sources of  control as the biological 
and socio-economic sciences? 
In answering such questions let us recall that a number of influential 
advocates did indeed urge the teaching of correctly-formulated political 
economy, usually  of the Malthusian type. Certainly, IIenry Brougham 
did so in his Practical  observation^.^^  And the Rev  Thomas Chalmers 
argued  at  length  that  the  Malthusian  variant  of  political  economy 
he favoured could be taught distinct  from politics, and he encouraged 
its  inclusion  in  Institutes'  curricula. There was 'no likelier instrument 
than a judicious  course of  economical doctrine, for tranquilizing  the 
popular mind'.  It would  be 'a  sedative to all  sorts of turbulence and 
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working  classes:  'the  infuriated  operatives,  instead  of  looking  to 
capitalists as the cause of their distress, should look at one another'.80 
But, in  practice  and  in  many  locales,  the intended  introduction  of 
such  subjects aroused  (or was thought likely to arouse) such passions 
among  possible  patrons that the enterprise  was  in  jeopardy.  And  so 
there  are  matters  of  local  institutional  politics  which  clearly  bear 
upon the content of the c~rriculum.~~ 
Another  possible  answer  has  the virtue  of  setting  the Mechanics' 
Institutes and their curricula in the more general context of educational 
innovation.  They  belong  toward  the  end  of  a  chain  of  cultural 
innovations  leading from Paley  on the one hand and Adam Smith on 
the  other, through  various  strands of  natural theology  and political 
economy,  always  to  increasingly  naturalistic  cosmologies.  It  is  likely 
that  what we have  before  us  is  a  series of  failed  experiments in  the 
construction of ideologies, all successively rejected by the lower orders, 
and successively  replaced by apparently more objective and naturalistic 
alternatives. Perhaps elite groups continually found themselves obliged 
to curtail  and  tone  down what  ideally  they would  have  wished  to 
convey  to the working classes,  in  a vain  attempt to gain  credibility. 
What  evidence  there  is  strongly  suggests  that  none  of  these 
ideological  manifestations  successfully  distracted  even  a  small 
proportion of the working classes from their own spontaneous political 
expressions.  Only  in  the  coercive  context  of  schools  for  children 
did  blatantly  teleological  interpretations  of  nature  survive  for any 
length of time, presumably being learned by rote and happily forgotten 
by  successive  captive  audiencesa2 There  is  nothing  here to suggest 
that  ideological  manipulations, in themselves, entice people into alien 
cosmologies  against  their  own  interests.  As  Tyrrell  has  clearly  and 
amusingly  demonstrated, the would-be bringers of  political  economy 
enlightenment to the Scottish workers were regarded by their audience 
not as disinterested  scholars but as  'employers'  spokesmen sheltering 
behind  a  facade  of  religious,  scientific  and  philanthropic  notions'. 
One  thousand  Dunfermline  working  men  subscribed  to Dr  Thomas 
Murray's political economy lectures in  1838,unfortunately for Murray 
as it  turned  out because the audience 'expected  to hear the doctrines 
of Radicalism demonstrated'. And a Scottish judge, Sir Archibald Alison, 
in  an  attempt  to  cast  doubt  on the efficacy  of  popular  scientific 
education  as  a means of  social  control, quoted this statement by the 
'operatives of Manchester' : Social Studies of Science 
We  are  anxiously  looking for a new form of social organization, in  harmony 
with  the lights  of the  age,  and  Lord  Brougham  thinks  to stop our mouths 
with kangaroos.83 
Given  previous  experience  with  recognizably  ideological 
formulations, it may be that the curricula of the Mechanics'  Institutes 
represent  a  modest, tempered  and more realistic  attempt at control. 
Their  stress  on mathematics and physical  sciences  reflects awareness 
that  studied  disinterest  and  apparent  objectivity  are  essential  if  a 
suspicious  audience  is  to be  attracted  and  its credibility  engaged;84 
this is the other side of the coin to the widespread ban upon political 
economy within the Institutes. And any lost opportunities for teleology 
and  moralizing  can  be  set  against  compensating  advantages  if  only 
an audience of artisans can be held. By sacrificing time to mathematics 
and physics as 'loss-leaders', audiences for delicately-drawn implications 
of  other  sciences  might  be gained,  and  ongoing,  informal  contacts 
with  the dominant sector of  the lower orders established. Moreover, 
as  we  have  noted  already,  'value-neutral'  science  might  crowd  out 
even  less  desirable alternatives; artisans learning science are preferable 
to artisans  plotting  revolution;  contemplative  artisans  are preferable 
to committed artisans.  Analogously, in  the world of the mind, value- 
neutral  science  'occupies  space'  which  the middle  classes  could  fill 
with  something  else  of  their  own  choice.  Thus,  in  terms  of  the 
characteristics  they  imputed  to the minds of  the lower  orders, it  at 
least  is  'solid  substance',  producing a kind of stability and preventing 
that unpredictable tendency to be swept up by every kind  of political 
stimulus chaiacteristic of the utterly ignorant.85 
We  have  obviously  been  treating the curriculum of the Mechanics' 
Institutes  as  a  communication  system,  carrying  messages  of  social 
control.  But  there  are  a  variety  of  ways  in  which  an  educational 
situation may exert  its  hoped-for controlling  influence, and only one 
of them, the content of the knowledge, is at the level of the explicit. 
Communication  systems, and  cultures generally, also  carry with them 
a  body  of  implicit  meanings  which  can  do important  work  in  the 
social  ~~stem.~6  In  the present  context, we should  also  look to the 
general  features of  scientific discourse, the parameters of  a  scientific 
cosmology  and  the social messages  conveyed by the very institutional 
existence  of  Mechanics'  Institutes  as  important  modes  of 
communication  and  possible  control; in  other words,  to the medium 
as well as the message. 
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a  communication  system  and  medium  for discourse  and  interaction. 
It  constructed  channels  along  which  an indefinite  number  of future 
attempts at negotiation and control could run. It provided a framework 
upon  which  the  culture  of a  stabilized  re-integrated  society  might 
eventually  be  built.  And  if  this  framework  appeared  permanent, 
immutable  and  constraining  to the  lower  orders,  but  provisional, 
manipulable and challenging to those above them, so much the better; 
straight  manipulation  would  be  a  pleasant  bonus,  but  'rational' 
communication, if  that  was  all  that  could  be  achieved, was reward 
enough. 
As  usual,  our  actors  themselves  had  explored  the  relationship 
between  communication  and  control.  Foster  had  deplored,  and 
identified  as very  dangerous,  the  gulf  of  non-communication which 
had  arisen  between  the  higher  and  lower  classes of the community, 
between 'refinement' and 'barbarism' : 
If  so  little  of  the  sense,  the  information,  the  liberalized  feeling,  and 
the  propriety  of  deportment,  which  we  are  to  ascribe  to  the higher  and 
cultivated  portion, goes  downward through  the  lower,  it  seems impossible 
but  that  there  must  be  more of  dissociation  and  repulsion  between  them, 
than  of  congruity  and  communication.  But  for  the  good  of  both  it  is 
exceedingly  desirable  that the upper  and  inferior orders should be on terms 
of communication  . . . and  therefore  that there  should be  a diminution of 
that  rudeness  of  mind  and  habits which  keeps  them  in  such  disconnexion 
and estrangement.g7 
What  was  lacking  was a  'medium  of  complacent communication', in 
the absence of which the lower orders were 'far removed and estranged 
from  the  more  cultivated  part  of  their  fellow  countrymen,  and 
consequently  from every  beneficial  influence  under which  a state of 
friendly  contiguity,  if  we  may  so  express  it,  would  have  placed 
them'.88  A  member  of  the  Glasgow  Mechanics'  Institute  praised 
the role  of  such  establishments  'in  removing  the feeling of jealousy 
and  distrust,  which  has  too long  obtained  between  the  higher  and 
wealthier  orders, and those in  less favoured circumstances'. The image 
of scientific activity  as  essentially  harmonious and co-operative could 
be invoked in the cause of control: 
Meeting,  as  both  classes  do, on  the  fair  field  of  science,  where all are as 
brothers,  and  pursuing,  it  may  be,  the  same  glorious  objects,  the wall  of 
separation  is  removed  for ever, and the best possible guarantee given  for the 
inviolable maintenance of the rights of property on the one hand,  and  the 
peace and security of society on the other.89 58  Social Studies of Science 
So  long  as  significant  numbers  of  'mechanics'  attended,  the 
Institutes'  directors rarely  failed  to remark  on the decorous concord 
of  classes  at the  lectures.  How  gratified  the mechanics  must  be  'to 
have  observed  the very  liberal  manner  in  which your fellow-citizens, 
who occupy the higher stations of society, have come forward to assist 
you in  obtaining that  instruction which your own means alone could 
not command'.g0  It  was a cause of immense satisfaction to directors 
that middle and lower classes could make common cause in the pursuit 
of  useful  knowledge.  As we have  shown, our informal psychological 
theorists believed  that manipulation  at the cultural  level would itself 
produce  changes  in  society.  Perhaps,  if  the  cosmology  underlying 
technological  processes  could  be  implanted in  the operatives'  minds, 
there would  be  more ready  acceptance of  the industrial  system  and 
their place in it. 
It  remains to  ask  why  natural  science  in  its more 'value-neutral' 
manifestations  was  selected  as  an  appropriate  medium  of 
communication  and  potential  common  culture.  Part  of  the answer 
doubtless lies in  the lack of any realistic  alternative  candidates. And 
part  must  lie  in  the  previous  use  of  scientific  culture  for purposes 
of  symbolic  expression  by  industrially-based  elite^.^ l  But  it  is  also 
possible  that  in  some  unverbalized,  intuitive  fashion,  actors  were 
aware  of  the way  in  which  the concepts and procedures of  science 
were particularly suited to expressing and exploring the many practical 
problems  of  organization  and  control  they  were  experiencing  as 
employers of labour and producers of commodities. 
Here, indeed, we have arrived at a speculative and undocumentable 
hypothesis, but it is worth dwelling upon it  for a brief  moment before 
passing  on. To  treat matter  instrumentally as the inert raw material 
required  by  a  productive  system  organized to produce commodities 
requires that  it  be  drained  of  moral  significance  and  homogenized, 
precisely  as  occurs  in  the scientific thought of the elite. To explain 
and  monitor systems of manufacture based upon organized sequences 
of  single  modifications  of  materials  implies  stochastically  linkable, 
mechanistic  notions  of  causality  which  are,  again,  characteristic  of 
science.  The  control and  co-ordination  of  complex,  interdependent 
structures  of  organized  productive  labour  is  greatly  facilitated  in 
many  ways  by  the  institutionalized  treatment  of  time  as  a  linear 
continuum;  many  areas  of  science  offer  ideal  models  of  such  a 
treatment.  And  finally,  and  most  importantly, modern  commercial 
exchange and organized  systematic production demand quantification 
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as are again provided by the esoteric culture of natural science. 
Thus, there may well have  been  a general,  not necessarily explicit 
or conscious,  realization  that  science  was  a  particularly  appropriate 
form  of  culture  for  general  dissemination  in  an  industrializing 
community.  It  could  lay  down  in  the mind  the general  form  of a 
communication  system  appropriate  for  controlling  and  monitoring 
the current  forms of  production.  Hence,  it  could  help  to  establish 
the work  habits required of a complexly organized work force, where 
individual  components  had  to  operate  within  close  physical  and 
temporal  margins  of  error,  and  were  highly  interdependent  and 
minimally redundant.92 
THE MORAL FORCE OF NATURE 
We  shall  conclude by relating the foregoing discussion  to the general 
question  of  how  knowledge  is  connected  with  an  interest  in  social 
order  and  control.  It  is  the  relevance  of our material  to aspects of 
this  important,  enduring  problem  which  has,  for us,  been the main 
source of its significance. 
Let  us start with the problem of whether general systems of ideas, 
world-views or cosmologies, in themselves,  can ever effectively control 
the behaviour  of  the audiences to which  they are addressed. This is 
an  important  focus  of  controversy  among  historians  and  social 
scientists.  In  the Marxist tradition, an orthodox position which insists 
upon the derivative  status of  such  ideas - of  consciousness - is, for 
readily  intelligible  reasons, perpetually threatened  by idealist heresies 
which  proclaim  the  potency  of  ideologies  and  legitimations  as 
autonomous determinants of men's actions; indeed, this idealist strand 
of  Marxism  has  probably  never  been  more  influential  than  at  the 
present  time.  Similarly, among those sociologists  and  anthropologists 
who loosely  follow the work of Emile Durkheim, and who constitute 
the  only  other  coherent  sociological  perspective  upon  knowledge 
and  its  production,  the  predominant  conception  of  cosmologies  as 
reflections  or  derivative  analogues  of  the  social  order,  exists  in 
perpetual tension with its converse? 3 
Thus,  there  are  significant  numbers  of  scholars  who,  like  our 
innovating  bourgeois  groups,  believe  that  knowledge  can  control 
people. On the whole, what we know of the Institutes counts against 
this belief. The cosmologies and bodies of knowledge first put forward 
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The  Institutes  failed  to  create  a  viable  audience  from  'mechanics' 
and  'artisans',  evidently  proving  much  more  attractive  to 
'petty-bourgeois'  groups  whose  existence  and  behaviour  were  not 
regarded  as  problematic.  They  failed  to modify  the consciousness 
of  the working  classes  to any  significant  degree.  And  their  science 
did  not  become  accepted  among  the  lower  orders  as  objective 
renderings  of  nature  or  neutral  frameworks  for  discourse  and 
communication.  Hence  their  tendency  to  make  way  for  curricula 
conceived  in  terms of  other functions: entertainment, or, much later, 
the  genuine  transmission  of  utilizable  technical  and  computational 
skills. 
Certainly we regard the evidence in this case as tending to confirm 
our  own  preferred  general  view,  that  people  cannot be  controlled 
through  ideas;  that  it  is  only  through  coercion,  the  manipulation 
of rights, or the generation of interests that social order can effectively 
be promoted  or  broken  down.  Such  a general  hypothesis,  however, 
can  never  be  straightforwardly  established  or  refuted  by  passive 
comparison  with  any  particular  set  of  findings. What proportion of 
workers, or mechanics, came to accept the doctrines of the Institutes, 
in  itself, settles nothing. Those who believe  in the potency of ideology 
will,  we  surmise,  be  able  to find  reasons  for its  general  inefficacy 
in  this particular case, just  as we, from our perspective, do not regard 
it  as at all inexplicable that workers and artisans did, very occasionally, 
accept the cosmology of the Institutes. 
Unfortunately,  we  know  far  too  little  about  such  men; further 
investigation  of  their  numbers  and  background  would  be  of great 
interest.94  Nevertheless,  given  the  general  content,  their  existence 
in  limited  numbers,  far from being  an anomaly, is  very  much to be 
expected  on our account. In  the 1830s and 40s, a 'labour aristocracy' 
was  differentiating  as  a  consequence  of  economic  change  and 
industrialization,  and  a  part  of  it  was  developing  a  characteristic 
'respectable'  culture  and  sustaining  such  institutions  as  Mutual 
Improvement  societies,  and  the  Temperance  and  Co-operative 
rno~ements.~~ The  immediate,  expedient  interests of this group did 
at times lead  them to ally  with those above rather than those below. 
And, as we  have  mentioned, employers and their associates sought to 
encourage their  differentiation and their  alliance.  As  well as cultural 
offerings like Mechanics'  Institutes, they preferred financial incentives, 
increased  access to rights in  property, the hope, and to a very limited 
extent,  the actuality of  upward  social  mobility. To the very  limited 
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to be  more receptive  to bourgeois  culture and  cosmology; for those 
with hopes of upward mobility, or  profiting from privileges guaranteed 
from  above,  this  would  not  be  an  inappropriate  form  of  cultural 
expression. To  ascribe  the  behaviour  and  beliefs  of  such  groups of 
workers to the potency of the Institutes' curricula would be to misread 
the consequences of economic change and the manipulation of interests 
as the consequences of ideas and ideologies. 
Let  us  move  now  to  the  question  of  when,  and  under  what 
circumstances,  social  groups  resort  to  conceptions  of  nature  as 
instruments  in  attempts  at  social  control.  The  work  of  social 
anthropologists,  involving  the  widest  possible  comparisons  of  the 
cosmologies of  different  societies,  has  revealed  the  significance  and 
complexity  of  this  question.  In  Purity  and  Danger  (1966), Mary 
Douglas  suggested  that whether  or not  natural  knowledge  reflected 
an  interest  in  social  control  was  determined  by the social structure 
of the society in  question. In  simple societies,  lacking  the social and 
institutional  differentiation  of  modern industrial  communities, social 
control  is  particularly  problematic.  Such  societies  lack  that 
interdependence of parts which, in  modern societies, makes for social 
stability  and  the  encapsulation  of  conflict;  nor  have  they  evolved 
specialized  institutions - police  forces  and  social  workers,  courts 
of law, public files and records, and the like - to  monitor and control 
deviance. The consequent greater degree of concern with social control 
as a practical problem leads to the invocation of nature as a guarantor 
of the moral order. Natural disaster  is threatened as the consequence 
of wrongdoing; good  crops or good  hunting bless  conformity. Thus, 
anthropomorphic accounts of nature 'crystallize  in the institutions'; a 
morally-alive  cosmology  emerges over  time. Conversely,  in  'modern' 
societies  moral and  natural knowledge  are free  to differentiate apart 
from each  other; forms of knowledge with impersonal  cosmological 
implications  can  emerge; conceptions  of  nature  need  not be put to 
work  in  the  interest  of  social  order.  Modern  science  is  thus  the 
characteristic,  impersonal  knowledge  of  a  differentiated  social 
structure; it is knowledge which has been able to  develop unconstrained 
by  an  interest  in  social  order  and  control  and  resultant 
anthropomorphizing tendencies. 
In  her  later  books,  Natural  Symbols (1970) and Implicit  Meanings 
(1975),  Professor  Douglas  repudiates  this  interesting  thesis.  Having 
become  aware  of  the  moral  use  of  appeals  to  nature  in  modern 
societies,  and  of  the existence  of  impersonal  cosmologies  in  simple 
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value  the existing social order and strong social  controls, this will be 
reflected  in  their  cosmologies  and  systems of  symbols; where  they 
do not,  it  will  not.  Since,  in  modern societies, an interest  in  social 
control and  the maintenance of the existing  order is  always evident, 
at  least  in  some groups,  Professor  Douglas  consistently  argues  that 
we  can  never  assume  our  own  natural  knowledge  to be  sustained 
independently of such  an interest; indeed  she suggests that a society 
wherein conceptions of nature were never invoked for moral or  political 
ends  is  'unimaginable'.  Like  the  historical  materialists,  Professor 
Douglas  now  believes  that  social  control  remains  problematic  for 
ruling  or exploiting  groups  in  al!  existing  societies,  and  knowledge 
is  always  liable  to be  influenced  by  this, and  hence  to reflect  the 
distribution of power. 
The  point  is  a  good  one;  certainly  it  would  be  foolishly 
complacent  to assume  the opposite; but it  is  surely  still worthwhile 
to speculate,  as  Mary  Douglas  did  in  her  earlier  Purity  and  Danger, 
on what  affects the extent to which  knowledge  is  influenced  by an 
interest  in  social  control. The protagonists of our study projected the 
organization and modification of knowledge  almost  entirely in terms 
of  an  interest  in  control.  Popular  education  generally,  at the time, 
was  overwhelmingly  dominated  by  the  same  interest.  The  content 
of  its  knowledge,  its  idiom,  its  arrangement,  its  structure,  in  every 
context, at every  level,  clearly revealed the influence of that interest. 
Correspondingly,  our  protagonists,  compared  to ourselves,  were 
intensely  concerned  with  the  problem  of  social  order:  they  feared 
revolution;  they  feared  massive  social  breakdown.  And,  arguably, 
their  fears  reflected  their  position  at  a  real  point  of  comparative 
institutional  instability.  Going  back  in  time, mentally  reversing  the 
processes  of urbanization and industrialization, we regenerate a society 
more  and  more  in  the grip of  traditional  institutional forms.  Going 
forward  into  the second  half  of  the  century, we find many of  the 
control  institutions  inaugurated  in  the great  sequence  of  bourgeois 
innovations  taking  effect, and  the social  relationships  and  conflicts 
in the urban areas stabilizing and moderating for other reasons. 
Does  this suggest  that at times when  problems of order are over- 
stretching  the  resources  of  existing  mechanisms  of  control, before 
institutional  responses  become  operative,  there  is  a  heightened 
tendency  to have  recourse  to  conceptions of  nature, and any other 
ideological  sources  of  moral  justification,  in  a  (futile)  attempt  to 
control  people  directly  by  ideas?  Or  does  this  hypothesis  merely 
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are successfully gripped by current ideologies? 
Finally,  let  us  consider  how  knowledge  is  affected,  when  it  is 
generated  and  developed  under  the  stimulus of  an interest  in  social 
control. In general, the effect is thought to  be an adverse one, although 
how precisely  it is conceived of varies. Realists would perhaps say that 
such an interest can serve only to distort belief  out of correspondence 
with  reality.  Instrumentalists  might  argue  that  beliefs  adapted  to 
further  social  interests  cannot  be  optimally  designed  to  further  an 
interest  in  prediction and technical  control, which is what we expect 
our scientific knowledge to  be.96 In  Purity and Daugev,  Mary Douglas 
considers  that  an  interest  in  social  control  anthropomorphizes 
knowledge and makes the universe  morally alive; impersonal, objective 
knowledge  only  appears  as  the  importance  of  this  interest  in  its 
constitution  declines.  For  Marxists  generally,  limited  social  interests 
of any kind are sources of ideological distortion. 
All  these  positions  indicate,  quite  rightly,  a  particular  need  for 
caution in  according  credibility to beliefs in any way connected with 
an  interest  in  social  control. But  it is unfortunate that they are often 
taken  to imply  on the one hand  that there is  no  need  to take such 
beliefs  seriously,  and  on the  other  that  the  development  of  our 
currently accepted  science  cannot  possibly  be  connected  in  any way 
with an interest in  control. Such views, when simply taken for  granted 
as  obvious  truths,  unduly  restrict  research  and  prevent  proper 
consideration  of what are, in  the last  analysis,  matters to be decided 
via empirical investigation. 
One  plausible  interpretation  of  our material  is  that it  shows the 
operation  of  an interest  in  social  control upon knowledge  leading to 
greater  impersonality  and objectivity. As we have said, the ideological 
precursors  of  the  Institutes'  curricula  were  the  crude  teleological 
formulations of eighteenth-century natural theology, and the restricting 
'iron  laws'  of  the  political  economists which  had  nature  guarantee 
the failure of  any attempt to alter the basics of the economic order. 
In  the  early  Institutes themselves,  we  find  a  movement  away  from 
these  cosmologies  toward  increasingly  objective,  'value-neutral'  forms 
of  knowledge:  political  economy  was  not  infrequently  taboo; 
mathematics  and  mechanics  were  generally given  pride of place. We 
know that  this was  often  done to facilitate  cooperation among the 
higher  orders,  where  opposed  groups  readily  perceived  the  moral 
and political presuppositions of their opponents in their most favoured 
cosmologies.  And  we may reasonably surmise that this move was also 
intended  to secure greater  credibility  among  the lower orders, who, 64  Social Studies of Science 
despite  their  allegedly  fragmented  and  manipulable  consciousness, 
were evidently as well able as their betters to sniff ideology and reject 
it. If  this was so then our protagonists were being forced to propagate 
more  and  more  'value-neutral'  cosmologies  as  they  experimented 
with the problem of producing  an adequate  integrative ideology in a 
conflict-riven social structure. 
We  shall  not  attempt to work  out what the implications of this 
suggestion  would  be with respect  to the vast  changes  in  the content 
and organization of institutionalized natural knowledge which followed 
our  period.  It  is,  however,  worth  suggesting  that  in  differentiated 
societies,  with  a  balance  of  power  between  conflicting  yet 
interdependent  groups, an  interest  in  social order, rather  than being 
a  constraint  upon  the  emergence  of  the kind  of  knowledge  which 
we, today, tend to value and regard as justified, might assist its growth 
and the decline of alternative forms. 
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Such an assertion may sound forced, especially  to those familiar with the careers 
of  those  very  few  lnstitutes which  were  transformed  into  technical  colleges 
later in the century (e.g. the Manchester Mechanics'  Institution and the Edinburgh 
School  of  Arts).  But  the  initial  stress  of  the Institutes on 'pure'  science and 
'scientific  principles',  their general  neglect  of  applied  subjects  and practically 
relevant  knowledge,  and  their total failure to develop (or even  seriously to plan 
for) actual  technical  research,  does  cast  doubt  on the extent and  immediacy 
of  genuine  utilitarian  concerns  as  motivating  their  foundation.  Moreover,  the 
claim  that teaching 'principles'  created  more creative and innovative employees 
comes  oddly  from those  who,  at  the time, were obsessed  with  inculcating in 
their labour-force a rigid  conformity and docile acceptance of routine. We  shall 68  Social Studies of Science 
see later that the Institutes' curricula included a reified, atomized, anti-theoretical 
version  of  scientific  knowledge  designed  precisely  to constrain  its  recipients 
and  stultify  their  imagination. As  for the general  avoidance  of  clearly  useful 
knowledge, this was probably essential at a time when employers and employees 
alike  found it  in  their  interests to prevent its dissemination, in order to exploit 
its possession by themselves. 
Moreover, we now have a very detailed study of  a major Mechanics'  Institute 
in  a  very  different  social  context  which  provides  indirect  support  for  our 
interpretation.  Bruce  Sinclair's  history  of  the  Franklin  lnstitute (see  note  52, 
below) is  an account of a popular scientific organization founded in Philadelphia 
in  1824, and  largely  inspired  by British  models. What is striking in his account 
is  that  the  Franklin  lnstitute  rapidly  'makes  good'  the  traditional  utilitarian 
justification  for scientifically  educating the people. It  soon is undertaking large- 
scale  technical  research  activities  which  are  perceived  as  useful  by  American 
manufacturers  and  politicians.  There  is  no  evidence  whatsoever  in  Sinclair's 
account  that  problems  of  social  control  were  of  immediate  significance  to 
contemporary  Philadelphians,  or  that  the  Institute  was  motivated by  a desire 
to remedy social disorder. On the other hand, in the British urban context where 
social  control  was  a practical  problem,  not one Mechanics'  Institute  of which 
we  are aware undertook,  in  its early  career, to translate  its utilitarian  rhetoric 
into applied research  reality. 
24.  John  Foster,  Class  Struggle  and  the  Industrial  Revolution:  Early 
Industrial  Capitalism in Three English Towns (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1974). is the best, and most provocative, recent source on this. 
25.  See  the  superb  essay  by  Sidney  Pollard,  'Factory  Discipline  in  the 
Industrial  Revolution',  Economic  History Review, 2nd series, Vol. 16 (1963-64), 
254-71:  also  Michael  Sanderson,  'Education  and  the  Factory  in  Industrial 
Lancashire'.  ibid., Vol. 20 (1967), 266-79. 
26.  Brian  Harrison,  Drink  and  the  Victorians  (London: Faber  and  Faber, 
1971) is  an  excellent  treatment  of  the  Temperance  Movement  and  its social 
purposes. 
27.  This  was  the  period  during  which  organized  municipal  police  forces 
came  into  being.  Parliamentary  commissions  on the policing of  cities were  as 
numerous as those on the education of the lower orders. 
28.  House  of  Commons,  Report  from  Select  Committee  on the State of 
Education (London, 1834). 49.  For similar sentiments, see Dick, op.cit. note 19, 
526-41. 
29.  Pollard,  op.cit.  note  25,  258,  quotes  Arkwright's  complaint  that  it 
was proving difficult to train  'human beings to renounce their desultory habits 
of work, and  identify  themselves with  the unvarying regularity of the complex 
automaton'.  Andrew  Ure,  The  Philosophy  of  Manufactures  (London,  1835), 
is a fertile source of such locutions. 
30.  This  thesis  is  advanced  and  established,  with  particular  reference  to 
Oldham, by Foster, op.cit. note 24. 
31.  Address  to the Inhabitants of Edinburgh  on the Necessity  of Removing 
the Causes of the Crimes which now Disgrace the City (Edinburgh, 1832),  6-7, 12. 
32.  Lawrence  Stone,  'Literacy  and  Education  in  England,  1640-1900', 
Past and Present, No. 42 (February 1969), 69-139 (110). 
33.  On  this  point, see  Johnson, op.cit. note 1,  106;  Webb, op.cit. note 20, 69  Shapin & Barnes: Science, Nature and Control 
passim.;  Stone,  op.cit.  note  32,  85-86.  For  a  contemporary  perception,  see 
Robinson, op.cit. note 11, 542: 
.  . . the  'people',  when  they  are  embarked  in  party-politics, will 
ever  turn  in  contempt  from Brougham  and  Place,  to read  Cobbett 
and Carlisle. 
34.  Stone, op.cit. note 32, 91;  Johnson, op.cit. note 1,  119. 
35.  Stone, op.cit. note 32, 137. 
36.  Full  title:  The Consequences of  a  Scientific Education to the Working 
Classes  of  this Country pointed out; and the Theories of  Mr. Brougham on that 
Subject  Confuted; in  a  Letter  to the Marquess  of  bnsdown.  By  a  Country 
Gentleman  (London, 1826). Other pamphlets in  the controversy include:  Henry 
Martin,  Observations  on the  Importance  and  Advantages  of  the  Education of 
the People (London, 1826);  E.W. Grinfield, A Reply to Mr. Brougham's  'Practical 
Observations  upon the Education of  the People. . . .  ' (London, 1825); George 
Wright,  Mischiefs  Exposed.  A  Letter  addressed  to  H.  Brougham,  Esq.,  M.P. 
shewing  the  Inutility,  Absurdity  and  lmpolicy  of  the  Scheme  Developed  in 
his 'Practical Observations . . . ' (London, 1826). 
37.  As 'Country Gentleman' put it: 
[Brougham]  cannot  surely  be  so  blind  to  his  own  interest,  as to 
promote so alarming an alteration. (Op.cit. note 36, 53.) 
38.  Ibid., 4-6, 16. 
39.  'Country Gentleman'  found Pope's celebration of the eighteenth-century 
Great  Chain  of Being  entirely apt as  a description  of  British  society  in  1825. 
(Ibid., 8) 
40.  Ibid., 9. 
41.  Ibid. 
42.  Ibid., 16. 
43.  Full  title: An  Essay on the Evils of  Popular  Ignorance: and a Discourse 
on  the  Communication  of Christianity  to the People of  Hindoostan (London, 
2nd edn, 1821). There were at least five editions of Foster's book. 
44.  Ibid., 205-06. 
45.  [John  Bird  Sumner  and  J.T.  Coleridge],  'Mechanics  Institutes  and 
Infant Schools', Quarterly  Review, Vol.  32 (1825), 410-28 (415-16). 
46.  Ibid., 416. 
47.  Brougham (1825). op.cit. note 4, 9. 
48.  This model of  thought has been widely and  persistently applied. Similar 
characteristics  have  repeatedly been  discerned  in  the thought  of  other  races, 
preliterate communities, mental  defectives and children.  It would be interesting 
to explore  how  far  recent  scientific work,  such  as  that  of  A. Jensen  (Genetics 
and  Education  [London: Methuen, 19721) should be taken as a further example 
of this.  Presumably,  the model serves as a general  rationalizing  resource which 
accounts those operating on the basis of an alternative scheme of things as having 
'no  scheme of  things',  and  those with  alternative  conventions of  rationality as 
'irrational'. 
49.  'Country Gentleman', op.cit. note 36, 66. Social Studies o  f'science 
50.  lbid., 17-18. 
51.  Ibid.,  22.  A  key  difference  between  educational  reactionaries  like 
'Country  Gentleman'  and  reformers like  Foster  and George Combe  is  that the 
former  believe  that the imputed  mental  characteristics  of  the lower  orders are 
'natural' (therefore, not surmountable), while the latter hold them to be 'induced 
by society'  (hence, 'unnatural'  and  improvable  by  social  intervention). See, for 
example, Combe, op.cit.  note  13: Combe maintained  that it was a violation  of 
natural  law  not to exercize all the mental  faculties - rational as well  as animal. 
For  an  analysis  of  the  rhetorical  resources employed  to express these  mental 
models,  see  S.  Shapin  and  B.  Barnes,  'Head  and  Hand:  Rhetorical  Resources 
in  British  Pedagogical Writing,  1770-1850', Oxford Review  of  Education, Vol. 2 
(1976), in press. 
52.  Ibid.,  5111; italics in text. Even  in  the Franklin  Institute of Philadelphia, 
educational  planners  observed  that  'To  practical  men,  theoretical  discussions 
are,  in  general,  unintelligible'.  (Bruce  Sinclair,  Philadelphia's  Philosopher 
Mechanics:  A  History  of  the  Franklin  Institute,  1824-1865 [Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 19741, 197.) 
53.  Foster, op.cit. note 43, 163-64. 
54.  Ibid., 169-70. 
55.  Ibid., 133-34;  italics in text. 
56.  One  great  problem  in  writing  the  history  of  Mechanics'  Institutes  is 
that there  is  so little  evidence  as to precisely how science subjects were taught 
in  the  various  establishments.  Even  in  the  case  of  the  larger  Institutes, such 
as  the  Edinburgh  School  of  Arts,  only  a  few  teaching  texts survive; there is 
very  little  anecdotal information from teachers as to their pedagogical  methods, 
and  almost  none  whatsoever  from  students  as  to  their  experiences  of  being 
taught.  Existing  sources  reveal  that,  with  very  few  exceptions,  the  lectorial 
style  was  universal.  Examination,  and  the awarding of  diplomas, was  confined 
to  the most ambitious  Institutes  in  the largest  cities. This scarcity  of  evidence 
on pedagogy makes it impossible for us to address ourselves to the very interesting 
suggestions  relating  knowledge  to control  in  Basil  Bernstein,  Class,  Codes  and 
Control (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971). 
57.  TheScotsman(1 January 1825): 
. . . Unlike  some  of  the  mechanic  institutions  which  have  been 
established  in  other places, after the example of the School of  Avts, 
but  which  have  wandered  widely  from  the  model,  the  students 
here  have  their  attention  solely  directed  to  those  objects  which 
will be of real practical utility to them in their trade. 
The Edinburgh model was followed by the founders of the Manchester Mechanics' 
Institution,  including the resistance to artisan-representation  on the Directorate. 
(Tylecote, op.cit. note 1,  129-31.) 
58.  Mathematics was  soon  added because  it  was found difficult in practice 
to teach physics to students with inadequate numeracy. The Directors reluctantly 
accepted an offer of gratis lectures on farriery and architecture, while consistently 
resisting  the teaching of  'a great many branches of science, which would distract 
[the  student's]  attention  by  their  multiplicity  . .  .  without  increasing  [the] 
utility  [of the School] .' (Leonard Horner, The Scotsman [2 June 18241  .) Shapin & Barnes: Science, h'ature and Control  7 1 
59.  David  de Giustino, Conquest of Mind: Phrenology  and  Victorian  Social 
Thought  (London:  Croom  Helm,  1975), Chapter  8;  Terry  Parssinen, 'Popular 
Science  and  Society:  The Phrenology  Movement  in  Early  Victorian  Britain', 
Journal of  Social  History, Vol.  8  (1974), 1-20. For a phrenologically-informed 
programme  for  a  Mechanics'  Institute,  see  Sir  G.S.  Mackenzie,  General 
Observations  on  the  Principles  of  Education:  for  the  Use  of  Mechanics' 
Institutions (Edinburgh, 1836), an address delivered  to the Inverness Mechanics' 
Institute. 
60.  Cf. Royle, op.cit. note 1  ;Tylecote, op.cit. note 1,  133, 139. 
61.  Thomas Hanna,  Memoirs of the Life  and Writings of Thomas Chalmers, 
D.D.  LL.D.,  I11  (Edinburgh  1851), 26; The  Scotsman  (2  June  1824); Third 
Report of the Edinburgh School of Arts (Edinburgh, 1824),  4-8. 
62.  Brougham, 1825, op.cit. note 4, 9. 
63.  'On  the General  Question  whether  the  Labouring  Classes  Ought  to be 
Educated,  and  to what  Extent', The Edinburgh  Christian Instructor, n.s., Vo1.2 
(1833), 519-27 (519-20); italics in text. 
64.  Compare this with  the allegedly  'metaphysical  science'  of  the Scottish 
academic  tradition  (G.E. Davie,  The Democratic  Intellect:  Scotland  and  Her 
Universities  in  the Nineteenth Century [Edinburgh: Edinburgh  University  Press, 
2nd edn, 19641, Chapter 8.). Although  the strong form of Davie's  thesis remains 
in some doubt, there is a real  contrast in the 'philosophical' character of the two 
forms of education. 
65.  Dick, op.cit. note 19, 386-87; italics in text. 
66.  James Pillans,  Three  Lectures  on the  Proper  Objects and  Methods  of 
Education  in  Reference  to  the  Different  Orders of  Society  .  .  . (Edinburgh, 
1836), 19-20. 
67.  For example, Combe on popular physiology: 
The  use  of  function  is  far  better  understood  when  founded  on a 
demonstration  of  the  structure  than  when  communicated  merely 
by verbal  description . . . (George Combe, On  Teaching Physiology 
and  Its  Application  in  Common  Schools  [Edinburgh,  18571,  3.) 
The point  is  not  that  'demonstrations'  are  only  to  be  found  in  the  teaching 
of the working classes, but that they are stressed  when the students are regarded 
as  deficient  in  the  abstract  thought  required;  workers  were  regarded  as 
constitutively deficient. Cf. Shapin and Barnes, op.cit. note 51. 
68.  Some suggestions as  to the sociological basis of the two epistemologies 
are  contained  in  Steven  Shapin,  'Phrenological  Knowledge  and  the  Social 
Structure  of  Early  Nineteenth-Century  Edinburgh',  Annals of  Science, Vo1.32 
(1975), 219-43 (235-40). 
69.  Foster, op.cit. note 43, 162-63. 
70.  Ibid.,  157. 
71.  Ibid.,  160-61  ;italics in text. 
72.  James  L.  Drummond, quoted  in  Combe,  op.cit.  note  13, 39.  See  also 
Dick on astronomy: 
It . . . unfolds to our view the most striking displays of the perfections 
of  the Deity, particularly  the grandeur of  his  Omnipotence. . . . In Social Studies of Science 
short, it prepares the mind  for the employments of the future world, 
and  demonstrates,  that the Creator has it in his power to distribute 
endlessly  diversified  streams of  felicity,  among  every  order  of  his 
intelligent offspring. . . (Dick, op.cit. note 19, 326, 353-55). 
73.  Combe, op.cit.  note 67, 13-14. Dick  (op.cit. note 19, 398-99) lists the 
following  areas  where  moral  lessons  may  be  derived  from  the  teaching  of 
physiology  to the  people:  diet  and  regimen,  cleanliness,  modes  of  dress,  the 
proper  use  of  food  and  drink  ('especially  the moral  and  physical  evils  which 
flow from  intemperance'),  'and  the evils which arise from immoderate exertion 
of the mental or corporeal powers'. 
74.  Combe, op.cit. note 13, 33;also Dick, op.cit note 19,  426-31. 
75.  Combe, ibid., 45. 
76.  But see Sumner and Coleridge, op.cit. note 45, 414: 
. . . A  public  lecturer,  who  is  so  inclined, will  find  no difficulty 
in  insinuating, together with his geometry or chemistry, the elements 
of infidelity and sedition. (!) 
77.  See,  for  example,  George  Lees,  Elements  of  Arithmetic, Algebra,  and 
Geometry,  for  the  Use  of  the  Students  of  the  Edinburgh  School  of  Arts 
(Edinburgh,  1826).  The  scarcity  of  surviving  representatives  of  the genre  is 
indicated by the bibliography of  Tylecote, op.cit. note 1. 
78.  See  the  following  example from the Third  Report  of  the  Haddington 
School  of  Arts,  quoted  in  A.  Tyrrell,  'Political  Economy,  Whiggism  and  the 
Education  of  Working-Class  Adults  in  Scotland  1817-40', Scottish  Historical 
Review, Vol. 48 (1969), 151-65 (158): 
Our  mechanics  do not  sufficiently  know  the  limits  of  their  own, 
nor the extent of their masters' just  rights. . . . Only let the working 
classes  be  trained  to discrimination, either by  that general  science 
which  sharpens the faculties of  all who are conversant  with  it; or 
let  them  be  made  acquainted  with  that particular  science, part of 
whose  object it  is  to elucidate the nature  of the relation in  which 
capitalists  and  labourers  stand  to  each  other; and  we  shall  be  as 
little disturbed  by  the spirit  of  combination, as by a revival  of the 
spirit of witchcraft. 
79.  Brougham (1825), op.cit. note 4, 5, 11. 
80.  Chalmers, op.cit. note 18, 386-92. 
81.  In  1822, when  the  physicist  David  Brewster  attempted,  for  purely 
entrepreneurial  reasons,  to subvert the  School of Arts,  his strongest  argument 
was  the  assertion  that  it  'had  assumed  a  political  character'.  (The  Scotsman 
[7  September  18221.)  Nothing  could,  if  proven, have  been  more effective  in 
eliminating the hard-won support of Edinburgh's Tories. See also note 21, above. 
82.  More  direct,  less  objective  and  highly  anthropomorphic  forms  of 
moralizing  natural  science continued  to be applied  to children  throughout  the 
nineteenth  century.  The  enormously  popular  'The  Reason  Why',  a  series  of 
Victorian  science texts for children, as one example of a ubiquitous genre, topped 
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of  the  idea  that  people  will  resort  to more indirect  attempts at control only 
when  they  are  obliged  to by the demonstrated  'cleverness'  of their  hoped-for 
audience.  See  also:  David  Layton,  Science  for the People: The Origins  of the 
School Science Curriculum in  England  (London: George Allen  & Unwin, 1973), 
esp. Chapters 1, 5. 
83.  Tyrrell,  op.cit.  note  78,  161,  165;  [Archibald  Alison],  'Progress  of 
Social  Disintegration.  No.  I.  The  Schoolmaster',  Blackwood's  Edinburgh 
Magazine,  Vol.  35  (1834), 228-48  (240).  The leftists  in  today's middle  classes 
who  fear  that  workers are currently  deluded  into acceptance of  capitalism by 
scientific  ideologies  and  other  'crucial'  legitimations  would  do well  to reflect 
on historical precedents such as this. 
84.  The only  alternative  strategy  was  to re-orient  the  curriculum  directly 
to  workers'  interests  and  hence,  per  impossibile,  against  employers' interests. 
One  variant  of  this  strategy  was  in  fact  adopted  by  middle-class  groups.  It 
consisted  in  modifying political  economy into a kind  of self-help  doctrine, or 
recipe  for how to rise  in the world. This could purport to offer some advantage 
to an  individual  worker, while  at the same time operating in  the interest of the 
employer  class  as  a whole, since  its prescriptions  could  never  bring  success  to 
workers collectively,  and, if  widely  followed, would  only set  employee  against 
employee. 
85.  Brougham (1825),op.cit. note 4, 32: 
The  more  widely  science  is  diffused,  the  better  will  the  Author 
of  all  things  be  known, and  the less will  the people be  'tossed  to 
and fro by the sleight of men. . . ' 
86.  Mary  Douglas,  Implicit  Meanings:  Essays  in  Anthropology  (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). 
87.  Foster, op.cit. note 43, 20031;  italics in text. 
88.  hid., 202, 205. 
89.  David  Burns,  Mechanics'  Institutions:  Their  Objects  and  Tendency 
(Glasgow, 18371, 56-57. 
90.  First  Report of  the Edinburgh  School  of  Arts  (Edinburgh, 18221, 15. 
91.  See esp. Thackray, op.cit. note 10;Shapin, op.cit. note 10. 
92.  This line of speculation has  been  pressed  a considerable way by Marxists 
such as Needham  and  Hobsbawm, and more recently by Marcuse. Other scholars, 
however,  have  tried  to understand  the clear historical link between science  and 
urban,  commercial  and  industrial  societies  in  much  broader  terms.  As  early 
as  1906  Veblen  was  accounting  for  the  general  features of  modern  scientific 
culture in terms such as these: 
In the modern culture, industry, industrial production  and  industrial 
products  have  progressively  gained  upon  humanity,  until  these 
creations of man's  ingenuity have latterly come to take the dominant 
place in the cultural scheme; and it  is not too much to say that they 
have become the chief force in shaping men's daily life, and therefore 
the chief  factor in shaping men's habits of thought. Hence men have 
learned to think in the terms in which the technological processes act. 74  Social Studies of Science 
Arkwright's  dream (see note 29, above) has, according to Veblen, been  fulfilled. 
(Thorstein  Veblen,  'The  Place  of  Science  in  Modern  Civilization',  American 
Journal  of  Sociology,  Vo1.2  [1906],  585-609;  repr.  in  Barry  Barnes  [ed.] , 
Sociology of  Science  [Harmondsworth,  Middx.:  Penguin,  19721, 321-30  [327- 
281 .)  We  would  not  wish  to take  issue  with  those  who  see  the  connection 
between  science and urban industrialization  in the broadest  terms, and we agree 
with Gellner that 'science  is the mode of  cognition of urban industrial societies' 
(Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 19641 , 
72). It  is  worth  noting, however, that mechanics avoided acquiring their 'habits 
of  thought'  at  Mechanics'  Institutes,  and  that  the  science  they  would 
have otherwise encountered there was hardly presented  as the 'creation of man's 
ingenuity'. 
93.  For those to whom this work is less well-known than that of the Marxist 
tradition, see: M.F.D.  Young (ed.), Knowledge and Control (London: Macmillan, 
1971); Bernstein,  op.cit. note 56; Mary  Douglas,  Purity  and  Danger  (London: 
Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul, 1966); idem., Natural  Symbols (London: Barrie  and 
Rockliff, 1970);  idem., Implicit Meanings, op.cit. note 86. 
94.  David  Burns,  the  author  of  the laudatory  prize-essay  on Mechanics' 
Institutions cited in note 89, was introduced as such a person.  His identification 
as a 'printer' is of limited value, because, as with occupational categories generally 
found  in  Institutes'  lists,  it  is unspecified  whether  he  was  a master-printer or 
an  employee  of  a  master-printer.  Again,  it  is  interesting  that  employers' 
perceptions  of  the  utility  of  Institutes  in  achieving  artisan  quiescence varied. 
One 'Master'  claimed that, during a strike, not one of his men who were scientific 
readers  was  'among  the  disorderly'  (Tylecote,  op.cit.  note  1, 48-49); while 
'Country  Gentleman'  (op.cit.  note  36, 6211)  referred to a 'respectable merchant 
at  Leeds'  who undertook  the scientific  education  of  selected  workers, only to 
find  that  'they  all  became  victims  to licentiousness  and  intemperance  at  an 
early  age.  The  fact  speaks for  itself.'  An  excellent  source  for the 'failure'  of 
the  Institutes  is  Richard  N.  Price,  'The  Working  Men's  Club  Movement  and 
Victorian  Social  Reform  Ideology',  Victorian  Studies, Vo1.15  (1  97  1  ),  11  7-47. 
95.  See esp. Foster, op.cit. note 24. 
96.  We  have  not  followed  Habermas's  well-known  account  of  knowledge 
and interest specifically, in this paper; cf., nonetheless, his Knowledge and Human 
Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). 